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CRIMMIGRATION-COUNTERTERRORISM
MARGARET HU*
The discriminatory effects that may stem from biometric ID
cybersurveillance and other algorithmically-driven screening technologies
can be better understood through the analytical prism of “crimmigrationcounterterrorism”: the conflation of crime, immigration, and counterterrorism
policy. The historical genesis for this phenomenon can be traced back to
multiple migration law developments, including the Chinese Exclusion Act
of 1882. To implement stricter immigration controls at the border and
interior, both the federal and state governments developed immigration
enforcement schemes that depended upon both biometric identification
documents and immigration screening protocols. This Article uses
contemporary attempts to implement an expanded regime of “extreme
vetting” to better understand modern crimmigration-counterterrorism
rationales and technologies. Like the implementation of the Chinese
Exclusion Act, extreme vetting, or enhanced vetting, relies upon biometric
data as an anchor point for identity databasing and security screening. Thus,
emerging vetting systems provide a timely example of the conflation of
crime, immigration, and counterterrorism policy. It concludes that Critical
Theory and theories of discrimination that stem from litigation surrounding
crimmigration-counterterrorism policies may suggest legal avenues to guard
against the risk of cyber-registries and algorithmic screening systems
dependent upon biometric databases that may promote discriminatory vetting.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the potential discriminatory impact of efforts
to expand biometric ID cybersurveillance1 and algorithmically-driven
cyber-registration,2 in the context of the Travel Ban,3 “extreme vetting,”4
1.
See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475
(2013) [hereinafter Hu, Biometric ID]; Margaret Hu, Biometric Cyberintelligence and the
Posse Comitatus Act, 66 EMORY L.J. 697 (2017) [hereinafter Hu, Biometric
Cyberintelligence]; KELLY A. GATES, OUR BIOMETRIC FUTURE: FACIAL RECOGNITION
TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF SURVEILLANCE (2011); JENNIFER LYNCH, FROM
FINGERPRINTS TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN U.S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES
AND BEYOND (2012); SHOSHANA AMIELLE MAGNET, WHEN BIOMETRICS FAIL: GENDER,
RACE, AND THE TECHNOLOGY OF IDENTITY (2011); Christopher W. Clifton, Deirdre K.
Mulligan & Raghu Ramakrishnan, Data Mining and Privacy: An Overview, in PRIVACY
AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 191, 203
(Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006); Laura K. Donohue,
Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric
Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407 (2012).
2.
See infra notes 173–175, 256–270 and accompanying text, and discussion
in Part III.B. See also Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633
(2017).
3.
See infra notes 22–31 and accompanying text, and discussion in Part II.B.
Many immigration, constitutional law, and national security scholars have commented on
the legality and constitutionality of the Travel Ban. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Hawaii v.
Trump: What would an “Objective Observer” Think of President Trump’s Travel Ban?,
LAWFARE INSTITUTE (May 16, 2017, 11:03 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/hawaii-vtrump-what-would-objective-observer-think-president-trumps-travel-ban
[https://perma.cc/HB27-6UXL]; Adam Cox, Why a Muslim Ban is Likely to be Held
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and other contemporary immigration policy developments.5 It suggests
that Critical Theories6—such as “critical biometric consciousness,”7

Unconstitutional: The Myth of Unconstrained Immigration Power, JUSTSECURITY (Jan.
30,
2017,
10:21
AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/36988/muslim-ban-heldunconstitutional-myth-unconstrained-immigration-power/
[https://perma.cc/XJ8PJAGM]; Marty Lederman, Unlocking the Mysteries of the Supreme Court’s Entry Ban
Case,
JUSTSECURITY
(June
27,
2017,
8:01
PM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/42577/mysteries-trump-v-irap/
[https://perma.cc/9JBY2YA7?type=image]; Leah Litman & Steve Vladeck, How the President’s “Clarifying”
Memorandum Destroys the Case for the Entry Ban, JUST SECURITY (June 15, 2017, 8:01
AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/42166/presidents-clarifying-memorandum-destroyscase-entry-ban/ [https://perma.cc/R7L3-E4VX]; Peter Margulies, The Travel Ban in the
Supreme Court: Crafting a Workable Remedy, LAWFARE INSTITUTE (June 26, 2017, 3:24
PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/travel-ban-supreme-court-crafting-workable-remedy
[https://perma.cc/EED6-UT2S]; IIya Somin, Trump’s Revised Travel Ban is Still Cruel
and Still Unconstitutional, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 6, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/06/trumpsrevised-travel-ban-is-still-cruel-and-still-unconstitutional/?utm_term=.5ae82e025123
[https://perma.cc/E53G-XCDN]; Mark Tushnet, Mootness and the Travel Ban, BALKIN
BLOGSPOT (June 2, 2017, 1:18 AM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/06/mootness-andtravel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/8YPX-S2UM]; Benjamin Wittes, Malevolence
Tempered by Incompetence: Trump’s Horrifying Executive Order on Refugees and Visas,
LAWFARE INSTITUTE (Jan. 28, 2017, 10:58 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/malevolencetempered-incompetence-trumps-horrifying-executive-order-refugees-and-visas
[https://perma.cc/VKU6-XEQK].
4.
See, e.g., Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting
Attempted Entry into United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats,
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017) [hereinafter Proclamation,
Sept. 24, Travel Ban III]; Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions Program with
Enhanced Vetting Capabilities, Exec. Order No. 13,815, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,055 (Oct. 27,
2017) (stating that enhanced vetting procedures “will enhance the ability of our systems
to check biometric and biographic information against a broad range of threat information
contained in various Federal watchlists and databases”) [hereinafter Exec. Order, Oct. 27,
Enhanced Vetting]. See also infra discussion in Part I.B, notes 145–148, and Part II.C.
5.
See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735 (2015)
[hereinafter Hu, Big Data Blacklisting]; Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD.
L. REV. 1 (2014); Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk
Assessment, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 45 (2014) (discussing DHS deployment of automated
risk assessment algorithms to analyze noncitizen data to assess detention and release
risks). See also infra notes 253–259 and accompanying text.
6.
See, e.g., CRITICAL THEORY & SOCIETY: A READER (Stephen Eric Bronner &
Douglas MacKay Kellner eds., 1989); DAVID COUZENS HOY & THOMAS MCCARTHY,
CRITICAL THEORY (1994); THOMAS MCCARTHY, IDEALS & ILLUSIONS: ON
RECONSTRUCTION & DECONSTRUCTION IN CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL THEORY (1993);
THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JÜRGEN HABERMAS (1989); THE
ESSENTIAL FRANKFURT READER 205 (Andrew Arato & Eike Gebhardt eds., 1985).
7.
SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS
116 (2015). See also Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J.
1487 (2000).
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Critical Race Theory,8 Surveillance Studies,9 Critical Terrorism
Studies,10 and other theories—are necessary to examine the increasing
racialization and subordinating effects of biometric ID cybersurveillance
and other technologies that may facilitate cyber-registration under
national security justifications. Specifically, the Article contends that the
expansion of biometric ID cybersurveillance and national security vetting
is supported by crimmigration11-counterterrorism12: a conflation of
crime, immigration, and counterterrorism policy.13
8.
See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE
PERMANENCE OF RACISM 144–45 (1993); DOROTHY BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS (2014); DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI,
ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA (2013); JESSIE DANIELS,
CYBER RACISM: WHITE SUPREMACY ONLINE AND THE NEW ATTACK ON CIVIL RIGHTS
(2009); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION (2012); LANI GUINIER, LIFT EVERY VOICE: TURNING A CIVIL RIGHTS
SETBACK INTO NEW VISION OF SOCIAL JUSTICE (1998); THE NEW BLACK: WHAT HAS
CHANGED—AND WHAT HAS NOT—WITH RACE IN AMERICA (KENNETH W. MACK &
GUY-URIEL E. CHARLES EDS.) (2013); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1992); Devon W. Carbado, Critical What What?,
43 CONN. L. REV. 1593 (2011); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363
(1992); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Colored Speech: Cross Burnings, Epistemics, and the
Triumph of the Crits?, 93 GEO. L.J. 575 (2005); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1331 (1988); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489
(2005).
9.
See generally JOHN GILLIOM & TORIN MONAHAN, SUPERVISION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY (2013); DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE
SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY LIFE (2001); DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN
OVERVIEW 16 (2007); Julie E. Cohen, Studying Law Studying Surveillance, 13
SURVEILLANCE
&
SOC’Y
91,
91
(2015),
https://ojs.library.queensu.ca/index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/law/5368
[https://perma.cc/AY56-CPRN]; Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Surveillance and the Formation of
Public Policy, 15 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 158 (2017); Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V.
Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J. SOC. 605 (2000); Sean P. Hier, Probing
the Surveillant Assemblage: On the Dialectics of Surveillance Practices as Processes of
Social Control, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 399 (2003); David Lyon, Surveillance,
Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, JulyDec. 2014, at 1 http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053951714541861
[https://perma.cc/4X4F-ZMY8].
10.
See, e.g., CRITICAL TERRORISM STUDIES: A NEW RESEARCH AGENDA 19, 140
(Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth & Jeroen Gunning eds., 2009); Amna Akbar,
Policing “Radicalization”, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809, 845–51 (2013); James Forman, Jr.,
Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make the War on Terror Possible,
33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 332–41 (2009); Jeroen Gunning, A Case for
Critical Terrorism Studies?, 42 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 363, 363–96 (2007).
11.
The term “crimmigration” was coined by Juliet Stumpf. Juliet Stumpf, The
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367
(2006). A growing body of literature examines the increasing merger of criminal law and
immigration law and policy. See, e.g., SOCIAL CONTROL AND JUSTICE: CRIMMIGRATION IN
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The historical genesis for this phenomenon can be traced back to
multiple migration law developments, including the Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882.14 The Chinese Exclusion Act facilitated stricter immigration
controls at the border and interior.15 These identification and vetting
systems were extended as part of the Japanese-American internment
effort during World War II and have become increasingly
technologically advanced in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11th, 2001.16
Anti-immigrant rhetoric, or the view that immigrants are inherently
suspicious and dangerous, is not a new phenomenon.17 The United
States, despite being comprised of immigrants, has a history of treating
individuals as suspect based on their nationality, ethnicity, and
immigration status: Chinese immigrants;18 Irish and other European
THE AGE OF FEAR 8–9

(Maria João Guia et al. eds., 2013); Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing
Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 137–38 (2009); Ingrid V.
Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforcement,
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1139–41 (2013); César Cuauhtémoc García
Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1457, 1467–68 [hereinafter
Hernández, Creating Crimigration]; César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing
Immigration Imprisonment, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1492–94 (2015); Yolanda
Vazquez, Advising Noncitizen Defendants on the Immigration Consequences of Criminal
Convictions: The Ethical Answer for the Criminal Defense Lawyer, the Court, and the
Sixth Amendment, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 31, 43 (2010).
12.
See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 138–41 (2009); MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS
HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 135–36 (2012); ERIK LUNA & WAYNE MCCORMACK,
UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF TERRORISM 141–44 (2d. ed. 2015).
13.
See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security
Law?, 66 EMORY L.J. 669, 676–77, 685–87 (2017); Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 1, at
1483–84; Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, supra note 5, at 1786; Biometric Cyberintelligence,
supra note 1, at 701. See generally DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 26–27, 34–35 (2003);
LEGAL BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS 386 (Mary
L. Dudziak & Leti Volpp eds., 2006); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996).
14.
Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).
15.
See Hernández, Creating Crimmigration, supra note 11, at 1486–87.
16.
See, e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES MYTH”: IMMIGRATION
AND CIVIL RIGHTS 15, 20–21 (2004). See also Cole, supra note 13.
17.
See, e.g., BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION
POLICY (2003); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and
the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998); JOHNSON, supra note
16. See generally Linda Bosniak, Member, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage
Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 104 (1994); Jennifer M. Chacón, Essay: Immigration and the
Bully Pulpit, 130 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 7 (2017); Karla M. McKanders, Federal
Preemption and Immigrants’ Rights, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 333 (2013). See also
supra note 11.
18.
See, e.g., H. Res. 683, 112th Cong. (Expressing that “the House of
Representatives regrets the passage of legislation that adversely affected people of
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immigrants;19 U.S. citizens of Japanese descent;20 Latino immigrants;21
and, with the recent Executive Orders,22 immigrants, refugees, and
travelers from countries with a Muslim-majority population.23
Recent
technological
developments
permit
increasing
cybersurveillance of populations, particularly the immigrant
demographic and related proxies. The expansion of biometric ID
cybersurveillance, a subset of broader trends in cybersurveillance and
Chinese origin in the United States because of their ethnicity,” including the Chinese
Exclusion Act”); IRIS CHANG, THE CHINESE IN AMERICA 130 (2003); ERIKA LEE, AT
AMERICA’S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA, 1882–1943 16–
17 (2005); JEAN PFAELZER, DRIVEN OUT: THE FORGOTTEN WAR AGAINST CHINESE
AMERICANS 253 (2008); FRANK WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA: BEYOND BLACK AND
WHITE (2002); Mark Kanazawa, Immigration, Exclusion, and Taxation: Anti-Chinese
Legislation in Gold Rush California, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 779, 779–83 (2005).
19.
See, e.g., National Origin Act, Pub. L. No. 68–139, Stat (1924); MAE M.
NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA 17–
21 (2004). See also MADISON GRANT, THE CONQUEST OF A CONTINENT 160 (1933); NOEL
IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 40–41(1995); THE ALIEN IN OUR MIDST
(Madison Grant & Chas. Stewart Davison eds., 1930).
20.
See, e.g., ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, ET. AL, RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION:
LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 34–35, 181 (2nd ed. 2013); ERIC L.
MULLER, AMERICAN INQUISITION: THE HUNT FOR JAPANESE AMERICAN DISLOYALTY IN
WWII (2007); MARY MATSUDA GRUENEWALD, LOOKING LIKE THE ENEMY: MY STORY OF
IMPRISONMENT IN JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNMENT CAMPS 3, 8–9 (2005); ONLY WHAT
WE COULD CARRY: THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT EXPERIENCE (Lawson Fusao
Inada ed., 2000); RICHARD REEVES, INFAMY: THE SHOCKING STORY OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT IN WORLD WAR II 98–100 (2015).
21.
See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (2014);
HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (2006); VICTOR C. ROMERO, ALIENATED: IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND EQUALITY IN AMERICA (2004).
22.
President Trump issued a pair of Executive Orders with the same title:
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States. The first was
issued on January 27, 2017. See Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into
the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) [hereinafter
Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I]. It was challenged in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington, and a temporary restraining order was granted.
See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The
government sought an emergency stay, which the Ninth Circuit denied. Id. at 1169.
Subsequently, the President issued a second Executive Order on March 6, 2017, with the
same title, but certain modifications. See Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist
Entry into the United States, Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017)
[hereinafter Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II]. The Ninth Circuit granted the
government’s unopposed motion to dismiss its appeal of the stay on the first Executive
Order. See Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 757 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
23.
The first Executive Order barred nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen from entering the United States for ninety days, both as
immigrants and non-immigrants. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d
554, 572 (4th Cir. 2017). The second Executive Order eliminated Iraq as one of the
designated countries. Id. at 573. These countries have predominately Muslim populations.
See id. at 572 n.2.
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dataveillance
(data
surveillance
within
the
umbrella
of
cybersurveillance), is supported by crimmigration-counterterrorism.24
Both the federal and state governments have developed immigration
enforcement schemes that depend upon biometric identification
documents and immigration screening protocols.25 Immigration controls
under the Chinese Exclusion Act employed one of the earliest methods
of bureaucratized biometric identification—the Bertillon System.26
The Travel Ban litigation offers an opportunity to examine why
discrimination by way of extreme vetting is difficult to conceptualize
under traditional legal frameworks when the discriminatory effect occurs
in a facially neutral way and is also technologically assisted.27 To date,
the Travel Ban litigation has been most developed in a pair of cases:
International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump28 and Hawaii v.
Trump.29 These cases addressed President Trump’s Order titled,
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United
States,30 which prohibited travel to the United States by nationals of six
Muslim-majority designated countries, capped refugee admissions, and
identified a review period to implement what has been described as
“extreme vetting.”31
24.
Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 1; see also infra notes 259–264 and note 304.
25.
Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).
26.
Kitty Calavita, The Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity, and “Passing”:
Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882–1910, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 22 (2000)
(“[O]fficers at ports of entry were told not only to photograph all entering and departing
Chinese laborers, but to conduct a complete ‘physical examination of his person required
by the Bertillon system of identifications’”).
27.
See, e.g., Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow. On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the Travel Ban cases, consolidating an appeal of both International
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump from the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals and
Hawaii v. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2085–86
(2017) (per curiam). However, on September 25, 2017, the Court removed both cases
from the oral argument calendar. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, No. 16–
1436, 2017 WL 2405595 (Sept. 25, 2017); Trump v. Hawaii, No. 16–1540, 2017 WL
2734554 (Sept. 25, 2017). Then, on October 10, 2017, and October 24, 2017, the Court
vacated the judgments and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot. Trump v.
International Refugee Assistance Project and Hawaii v. Trump, respectively. See Trump
v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, No. 16–1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (Oct. 10, 2017);
Trump v. Hawaii, No. 16–1540, 2017 WL 4782860 (Oct. 24, 2017).
28.
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en
banc), cert. granted 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), vacating as moot 2017 WL 4518553.
29.
Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), cert. granted
137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), vacating as moot 2017 WL 4782860.
30.
Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II.
31.
Id. at 13209–12. See also Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Justice:
Judicial Review of Immigration Law in the Trump Administration, 35–48 (Roger
Williams
Univ.
Sch.
of
Law,
Working
Paper
No.
177,
2017),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3029655 [https://perma.cc/VDQ4-PUN6] (arguing for a more
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Various incarnations of the Travel Ban, and the associated legal
challenges, currently focus the public’s attention on the entry ban aspects
of the Executive Orders. Yet, the more significant impact of the
Executive Orders is the implementation of a cybersurveillance policy
through enhanced vetting. Extreme or enhanced vetting is a screening
process that entails using forms of cybersurveillance to collect, store and
analyze information concerning not only immigrants, but potentially all
U.S. citizens. And for those who secure entrance, cybersurveillance
technologies will play a role in their tracking and supervision, such as the
creation of cyber-registration systems or cyber-registries.
Just as the Trump administration’s Executive Orders rest upon legal
precedent mired in controversial historical moments, so the attempt to
register and track foreign persons in this country has itself an unfortunate
genealogy. In both cases, understanding the past is crucial to
contextualizing the present. In order to better understand the surveillance
implications of “extreme vetting” and potential cyber-registration, Part I
begins with a review of prior efforts in that regard, with a large focus on
the Chinese Exclusion Acts of the nineteenth century as the framework
for understanding current ambitions. Part II summarizes the Trump
administration’s current efforts in immigration policy to restrict entry
from several Muslim-majority countries. These executive actions are
referred to as the “Muslim Ban” or the “Travel Ban.” Part II explains that
the Travel Ban’s proposal for “extreme vetting” adopts expansion of
vetting and screening protocols that are dependent upon biometric
identification systems. It suggests how these vetting and screening
systems are likely to serve as proxies for race and other classifications
that can facilitate cybersurveillance and dataveillance.
In Part III, the Article utilizes Critical Theory to better evaluate how
crimmigration-counterterrorism policy, when combined with biometric
ID cybersurveillance technologies and databasing, can lead to a
phenomenon of cyber-registration. Without the tools of Critical Theory,
it will be difficult to examine the racialization and discriminatory impact
of crimmigration-counterterrorism. This is especially the case where the
technological tools of cyber-registration may appear to be race-neutral
and where the crimmigration-counterterrorism policy, such as the Travel
Ban, purports to be facially neutral under the law. The Article concludes
that Critical Theory, combined with collateral discrimination theories
that have arisen from the litigation surrounding the Travel Ban, may
suggest legal avenues to guard against cyber-registries and algorithmicdriven screening methods that may promote discrimination.

searching judicial review of "extreme vetting” and the need to recognize the significant
long-term impact of “extreme vetting”).
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I. UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE OF CRIMMIGRATIONCOUNTERTERRORISM POLICY THROUGH THE TRAJECTORY OF
IMMIGRATION LAW AND BIOMETRIC ID CYBERSURVEILLANCE
Technology and immigration policy began to intersect with the
introduction of biometric-based technologies and data computing. In the
1870s and 1880s, advances in mass photography, fingerprinting
methodologies, and data cataloguing began to emerge. Additionally,
database-sorting technology was introduced through the invention of the
Hollerith data-sorting machine in the 1880s.32 The Hollerith machine was
eventually acquired by IBM, which led to the development of the
computer.33 The Hollerith machine revolutionized the federal
government’s ability to count, track, and follow its population for metric
purposes. However, there remained the question of how to appropriately
implement internal and external migration control, particularly tracking
of the Chinese who could lawfully remain in the United States after
Chinese Exclusion became national policy.
In 1882, Congress passed “An Act to Execute Certain Treaty
Stipulations Relating to Chinese,”34 commonly referred to as “The
Chinese Exclusion Act.” This Act arose as part of an anti-Chinese
movement that commenced in California and other western states.35 It
barred the entry of Chinese laborers into the United States for ten years
and prohibited Chinese laborers who had entered after the Act’s passage
from remaining.36 The Act specifically defined Chinese laborers as “both
skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining.”37 The
rationale for the Act included national security objectives, in that
Congress reasoned that “the coming of Chinese laborers to this country
endangers the good order of certain localities within the territory
thereof[.]”38
After passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, in order to
implement stricter immigration controls at the border, the federal
government developed more elaborate immigration enforcement schemes

32.
SIMON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 17–18 (Deborah Russell ed., 2000).
33.
Id. at 18.
34.
Chinese Exclusion Act, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943).
35.
See Calavita, supra note 26, at 4.
36.
Chinese Exclusion Act § 1. (“[U]ntil the expiration of ten years next after
the passage of this act, the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States be
. . . suspended; and during such suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese laborer
to come, or having so come . . . to remain within the United States.”); see also Calavita,
supra note 26, at 1–2.
37.
Chinese Exclusion Act § 15.
38.
Id. at pmbl.
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that depended upon identification documents. Thus, the federal
government began relying more on identification and travel documents,
such as visas and passports, to control who could be lawfully admitted in
the United States. The federal government also developed a system of
“gatekeepers”: those tasked with distributing documents and inspecting
documents to keep unwanted migrants out. One scholar refers to this as
an “unprecedented system” of federal immigration policy through
“remote control.”39
In 1885, biometric technology was combined with the concept of
immigration registration when it was recommended that all Chinese
immigrants in San Francisco could be registered by the city through
fingerprinting and biographic data cataloguing.40 Soon thereafter,
Congress adopted a national policy of identification documentation
incorporating biometric technology through passage of the Geary Act of
1892.41 The Geary Act extended the Chinese Exclusion Act, due to
expire in 1882, by another ten years.42 The Geary Act, along with an
amendment titled the McCreary Amendment, required all Chinese in the
United States to carry on their person certificates of residence and
identity, which required the inclusion of a photograph.43 The Geary Act
required that the certificates “shall contain the name, age, local residence
and occupation of the applicant[,]”44 and required “two white witnesses
to testify to a Chinese person’s immigration status.”45
By 1892, census data estimated that approximately 110,000 Chinese
remained lawfully in the United States in the intervening decade after the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.46 One historian notes that the Geary Act,
also colloquially referred to as the “Dog Tag Law” at the time of its
passage,47 reflected a “suspicion Chinese were attempting to enter the
country under fraudulent pretenses.”48 Falsifying identity documents or
failing to carry the “certificate of residence” was “a federal crime
punishable by a year’s imprisonment with hard labor[,]”49 and
deportation at the expense of those sentenced, because the federal
39.
Aristide R. Zolberg, Matters of State: Theorizing Immigration Policy, in
THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 71, 75
(Charles Hirschman et al. eds., 1999).
40.
Garfinkel, supra note 32, at 42.
41.
Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892) (amended 1893) (repealed 1943).
42.
Id. § 1.
43.
Id.
44.
Id. § 7.
45.
PFAELZER, supra note 18, at 296.
46.
Id. at 291.
47.
Id.
48.
Lee, supra note 18, at 41.
49.
PFAELZER, supra note 18, at 292.
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government did not have adequate funding to deport those found guilty.50
Although fifteen states and territories urged Congress and President
Harrison to engage in full-scale deportation of the remaining 110,000
Chinese in the country,51 this option was declined due to its
impracticality in logistics and cost.52 The implementation of an
identification document and internal “gatekeeping” system under the
Geary Act was the compromise solution.
Some members of Congress, however, protested the Geary Act.
Illinois Representative Robert R. Hitt denounced the Geary Act, drawing
comparisons between the “Dog Tag Law” with the type of social control
mechanisms that had been implemented during the slave era.53
It is proposed to have 100,000 . . . men in our country
ticketed, tagged, almost branded—the old slavery days
returned. Never before in a free country was there such a
system of tagging a man like a dog to be caught by the
police and examined, and if his tag or collar is not all right,
taken to the pound or drowned or shot . . . Never before was
it applied by a free people to a human being with the
exception (which we can never refer to with pride) of the
sad days of slavery.54
A. History of U.S. Immigration Policy and Biometric Vetting
Consequently, biometric identification played a significant role in
immigration law at the earliest developments of what is now known as
the modern federal immigration law scheme. The Chinese Exclusion Act
required protocols to identify Chinese immigrants. Identification cards
and immigration screening procedures arose as a method to track,
inspect, and deport Chinese laborers present in the United States at the
turn of the century.
The debates that led to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act
emphasized the perceived threat of Chinese immigrants, with one
Senator, John Franklin Miller of California, referring to the entry as a
“Chinese invasion”55 that was a “stealthy, strategic, but peaceful invasion

50.
Id. at 305.
51.
Id. at 296 (citation omitted).
52.
Id. at 305 (“Democratic attorney general Richard Olney reported that it
would cost $6 million to deport unregistered Chinese, and he had only $16,806 left in his
fund.”) (citation omitted).
53.
Id. at 296 (citation omitted).
54.
Id.
55.
13 Cong. Rec. 1481–85 (1882) (Remarks of Senator John Franklin Miller of
California (arguing that a vote against the measure suggests that the United States “is
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as destructive in its results and more potent for evil than an invasion by
an army with banners.”56 Senator Miller argued that Chinese immigrants
with their “peculiar civilization” could overwhelm “the American people
and Anglo-Saxon civilization,” suggesting that American civilization
might not endure a wave of Chinese immigration.57
In the nineteenth century, hysteria about a civilizational threat meant
that there must be an objective means for “properly identifying” Chinese
laborers who were in the United States before the Act was passed.58 It
required the “collector of customs” to list Chinese laborers who were
about to depart from the United States59 in “registry-books.”60 This
registration required customs officials to record the “name, age,
occupation, last place of residence, physical marks of peculiarities, and
all facts necessary for the identification of such Chinese laborers.”61
The laborers were entitled to receive a certificate that contained “a
statement of the name, age, occupation, last place of residence, personal
description, and facts of identification of the Chinese laborer to whom
the certificate is issued . . . . ”62 The certificate permitted the laborers to
return to the United States.63 The certificate system did not apply only to
Chinese laborers who were entering and exiting the United States.
Section 6 of the Act also required “every Chinese person other than a
laborer who may be entitled by said treaty and this act to come within the
United States” to receive a certificate issued by the Chinese government
that identified them as an individual entitled to enter the United States.64
That certificate also required identifying information, including “age,
height, and all physical peculiarities.”65

now in favor of the unrestricted importation of Chinese; that it looks with favor upon the
Chinese invasion now in progress.”)).
56.
Id. at 1482.
57.
Id. at 1483. (“If we continue to permit the introduction of this strange
people, with their peculiar civilization, until they form a considerable part of our
population, what is to be the effect upon the American people and Anglo-Saxon
civilization? Can these two civilizations endure side by side as two distinct and hostile
forces? Is American civilization as unimpressible as Chinese civilization? When the end
comes for one or the other, which will be found to have survived?”).
58.
Chinese Exclusion Act § 4 (1882) (repealed 1943).
59.
Per the Act, this was to “furnish [Chinese laborers] . . . with the proper
evidence of their right to come to the United States of their free will and accord, as
provided by the treaty between the United States and China.” Id.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id. § 6.
65.
Id.
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Chinese nationals who did not have a required certificate were
barred entry to the United States, and any “Chinese person found
unlawfully within the United States shall be caused to be removed from
the country to whence he came . . . at the cost of the United
States . . . . ”66 Section 14 of the Act highlighted what Congress
perceived as the suspect nature of Chinese nationals by prohibiting state
and federal courts from granting citizenship to Chinese individuals.67
This continuation of the Chinese Exclusion Act,68 therefore,
expanded the documentation requirements for Chinese individuals in the
United States. 69 All Chinese had to carry a registration certificate, which
showed that they were permitted to be in the United States.70 Chinese
individuals seeking to acquire U.S. citizenship were required to possess a
birth certificate that proved that they had been born in the United States,
and at that time that was “the only route open to the Chinese . . . to
acquire U.S. citizenship . . . . ”71 The registration requirement was
“highly controversial” because no other aliens had such registration
requirements, and the State Department itself was concerned about
foreign relations.72
The certificates mandated by the Geary Act contained the same
information required by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, including
“physical peculiarities.”73 Detailed descriptions of physical traits of
Chinese nationals were considered essential forms of identification.74
The Acts also focused on social class, as entry restrictions were focused
on Chinese laborers.75 Individuals in exempt classes—merchants,
students, teachers, or travelers—received a Section 6 certificate,
distinguishing them from the laborers.76
In 1903, customs officers at ports of entry began utilizing the
Bertillon system as part of a way to record and track Chinese nationals,

66.
Id. § 12.
67.
Id. §14 (“[H]ereafter no State court or court of the United States shall admit
Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed.”).
68.
Geary Act, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25 (1892) (amended 1893) (repealed 1943).
69.
Id.
70.
Calavita, supra note 26, at 20–21.
71.
Id. at 21
72.
Id. at 21 n.15.
73.
Id. at 21 (“Particularly in the early years before photographs were widely
available, the designation of ‘physical marks or peculiarities’ was deemed critical.”).
74.
Id. at 21–22; Jonathan Weinberg, Proving Identity, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 731,
745–46 (2017).
75.
Calavita, supra note 26, at 1–2.
76.
Id. at 21 (“[S]ection 6 certificates issued by the Chinese government
provided evidence that one belonged to an exempt status—merchant, student, teacher, or
traveler for pleasure or curiosity.”).

968

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

particularly laborers,77 based upon French criminologist Alphonse
Bertillon’s system of measurements in tracking and identifying criminals
in France.78 Bertillon’s work focused on “practical and administrative”
aspects of identification.79 Bertillon’s system further relied on
“anthropometric measurements of arrested persons[,]” “standardized
photographs” and “verbal portrait[s].”80 These details were listed on
cards that were filed at police departments, permitting identification and
tracking of individual arrests.81 Bertillon’s methods have been described
as a “curious statistical mechanism: that of recording the body’s markers,
normally common to all, in sufficient detail as to render them specific to
one.”82
Bertillon developed a means of standardizing biometric
identification, now referred to as “Bertillonage.”83 Bertillon’s system
required measuring parts of the offender’s body, including the head, ears,
feet, and limbs, as well as eye color, scars, and other physical identifying
characteristics.84 The system emphasized standardization of the way
police viewed a suspect and recorded their information, and “archive[d]
the file on each subject by ‘individualising him in the midst of the
multitude of human beings.’”85 Bertillonage later added fingerprinting to
the identification processes.86 The Bertillon system, although relying on
small data world measurements and observations, represented a means of
expanding security data. One expert explains:
By turning the body into code, it had the potential to allow
security data to travel. . . . [I]t spread from Europe to the
Americas and along the routes of empire, where fingerprinting
was simultaneously on the rise . . . . If you were trading under a
certain name in Bengal in say, 1898 but were an imposter or
swindler, the Bertillon system promised your undoing. You

77.
Calavita, supra note 26, at 22.
78.
Weinberg, supra note 74, at 746.
79.
Mark Maguire, The Birth of Biometric Security, ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY,
Apr. 2009 at 9, 12.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
BROWNE, supra note 7, at 112.
84.
Id.
85.
Maguire, supra note 79, at 12 (quoting ALPHONSE BERTILLON,
IDENTIFICATION ANTHROPOMETRIQUE: INSTRUCTIONS SIGNALETIQUES 4 (1893)).
86.
Id. at 13.
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had, even in the 19th century, a modern shadow—a so-called
data double.87
Bertillon’s work has been characterized as “less of a triumph in science
and more of a triumph in filing[,]”88 but the standardization of
identification and characteristics, and emphasis on administrative
governance is echoed in modern big data biometric cybersurveillance.
The use of the Bertillon system in tracking and identifying Chinese
nationals in the United States is of interest because it suggests that such
immigrants were inherently suspect. The system was developed for use
in identifying arrested individuals and criminals.89 The Department of
Commerce and Labor issued extensive guidelines for utilizing the
Bertillon system in identifying Chinese laborers, specifying highly
detailed measurements.90 External identifiers, including class, were also
important indicators for physical identification,91 and customs officials
could deny entry to individuals who held Section 6 certificates if the
customs officials believed that their physical characteristics and
appearances indicated they were truly laborers.92
The Geary Act also required Chinese laborers who were entitled to
be in the United States to apply for a certificate of residence.93 The
laborer was required to prove his entitlement to remain in the United
States.94 The Secretary of the Treasury prescribed rules and regulations
for proof sufficient to receive a certificate.95 The regulations required that
“the fact of residence shall be proved by ‘at least one credible witness of
good character,’ or, in case of necessity, by other proof.”96 Failure to
obtain or apply for a certificate within the year after the Geary Act was
passed was evidence that the Chinese laborer was not lawfully present in
the United States, and was not entitled to remain, thus subjecting him to
deportation.97 A laborer could not circumvent deportation unless he
could establish a valid reason for his failure to obtain a certificate such as
accident or illness, such evidence had to be “‘to the satisfaction of the
87.
Id.
88.
Id. at 12.
89.
Weinberg, supra note 74, at 746.
90.
See Calavita, supra note 26, at 22–23 (quoting extensively from the 1903
guidelines that specified how to measure Chinese immigrants and laborers).
91.
Id. at 24.
92.
Id. at 24–25, 24 & n.19.
93.
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 726 (1893).
94.
Id. (“[B]y making it the duty of the Chinese laborer to apply to the collector
of internal revenue of the district for a certificate, necessarily implies a correlative duty of
the collector to grant him a certificate, upon due proof of the requisite facts.”).
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Id. at 727.

970

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

court, and [supported] by at least one credible white witness,
[demonstrating] that he was a resident of the United States at the time of
the passage of this act.’”98
Challenges to the Geary Act on substantive due process and other
constitutional grounds failed. In Fong Yue Ting v. United States,99 the
Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he power to exclude or to expel aliens,
being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the political
departments of the government[.]”100 “The right of a nation to expel or
deport foreigners,” explained the Court, is “absolute and
unqualified[,]”101 and the plenary power doctrine, an idea that the federal
immigration power flowed from “unlimited inherent sovereign
powers[,]” was cemented.102 Justice Brewer dissented: “This doctrine of
powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite and dangerous.
Where are the limits to such powers to be found, and by whom are they
to be pronounced?”103
The Court further upheld the validity of requiring certificates of
residence,104 explaining that Congress had the right to “expel aliens of a
particular class, or permit them to remain, has undoubtedly the right to
provide a system of registration and identification of the members of that
class within the country, and to take all proper means to carry out the
system which it provides.”105 The Court acknowledged that the effect of
the Geary Act was to create a presumption that any Chinese laborer
without a residence certificate in the United States was presumed not to
be entitled to be in the United States.106 The Court found that the
procedures afforded to Chinese nationals were sufficient—despite the
fact that the burden of proof rested solely on the Chinese individual to
prove that suspicion did not apply.107 This burden, as well as the
requirement of a “credible white witness,” the Court explained “is within
the acknowledged power of every legislature to prescribe the evidence
which shall be received, and the effect of that evidence, in the courts of

98.
Id.
99.
149 U.S. 698 (1893).
100. Id. at 713.
101. Id. at 707.
102. Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of
Plenary Power, in IMMIGRATION LAW STORIES 7 (David A. Martin & Peter Schuck eds.,
2005). See also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs,
81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002).
103. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 737.
104. Id. at 698.
105. Id. at 714.
106. Id. at 728.
107. Id. at 729.
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its own government.”108 Witness competency—even a requirement of a
witness’s race, the Court stated, was a matter for Congress to decide.109
The Court’s ruling suggested that Chinese individuals’ testimony
was less trustworthy. The Court deferred heavily to Congress.110 Quoting
Justice Field’s opinion in Chae Chan Ping v. United States,111 the Court
explained that Congress may have required a white witness because in
prior cases, “the testimony of Chinese persons admitted to prove similar
facts ‘was attended with great embarrassment, from the suspicious
nature, in many instances, of the testimony offered to establish the
residence of the parties, arising from the loose notions entertained by the
witnesses of the obligation of an oath.’”112
Justice Brewer dissented, arguing that there is no “arbitrary and
unrestrained power to banish residents, even resident aliens.”113 Under
Justice Brewer’s perspective, because the Fourteenth Amendment
applied to “persons,” then it applied to “all persons lawfully within the
territory of the United States” and thus, residents of the United States—
including Chinese nationals who were lawfully present—were entitled to
its protections.114 Justice Brewer argued that Section 6 of the Geary Act
violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it “imposes punishment
without a trial, and punishment cruel and severe. It places the liberty of
one individual subject to the unrestrained control of another.”115 Justice
Brewer’s opinion was not written out of any feelings of racial
inequality—he expressed anti-Chinese sentiments throughout, stating
that Chinese nationals in the United States obtained constitutional
protections “by sufferance and not of right.”116
Yet, his concern was about broader democratic norms. If Congress
exercised this power, he reasoned, “[W]ho shall say it will not be
exercised to-morrow against other classes and other people? If the
guaranties of these amendments can be thus ignored in order to get rid of
a distasteful class what security have others that a like disregard of its
108. Id.
109. Id. (“The competency of all witnesses, without regard to their color, to
testify in the courts of the United States, rests on acts of Congress, which Congress may,
at its discretion, modify or repeal.”).
110. Id. (“[R]equiring a Chinese alien, claiming the privilege of remaining in the
United States, to prove the fact of his residence here at the time of the passage of the act
‘by at least one credible white witness’ may have been the experience of congress[.]”).
Id.
111. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
112. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730 (quoting Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at
598).
113. Id. at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 739 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 739–40 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 743 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
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provisions may not be resorted to?”117 Justice Field also dissented,
rejecting the majority’s conclusion “that ‘congress, under the power to
exclude or expel aliens, might have directed any Chinese laborer found
in the United States without a certificate of residence to be removed out
of the country by executive officers, without judicial trial or examination,
just as it might have authorized such officers absolutely to prevent his
entrance into the country.’”118 Justice Field argued that expelling
residents of the United States (even foreign nationals) without
constitutional compliance demonstrated “an unlimited and despotic
power.”119 Justice Field dissented vehemently from the procedures set
forth, particularly the shift in burden of proof, as well as the “credible
white witness” requirement.120
Regardless of how the Chinese Exclusion Acts fared before the
Court, mechanically, it entailed identifying one by national origin
through an attempt at a systemic accumulation of data that was both
biometric and biographical. The Bertillon system was, in short, an
attempt to systematize identity management. While the acquisition of
data about an individual serves to facilitate recognition, it also enables
analysis. Biometric and biographical data on Chinese immigrants
enabled the government to begin generalizing and classifying the kinds
of characteristics that might be typical of the class subject to this
surveillance. That, in turn, facilitated administrative decisionmaking; for
example, distinguishing between skilled and unskilled laborers, and
enabled inferences of criminality and national security concerns. Finally,
that administrative decision making facilitated preferential immigration
decisions.
Thus, one of the earliest manifestations of the conflation of crime,
immigration, and national security policy could be seen through the
development of an identity management system of Chinese immigrants
in the United States. The crimmigration-counterrorism phenomena, now
reflected in extreme vetting, is a contemporary example of this troubling

117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. (Brewer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 755 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 756 (Field, J., dissenting).
Id. at 759–60 (Field, J., dissenting).

Here the government undertakes to exact of the party arrested the
testimony of a witness of a particular color, though conclusive and
incontestable testimony from others may be adduced. The law might
as well have said that unless the laborer should also present a
particular person as a witness who could not be produced, from
sickness, absence, or other cause, such as the archbishop of the State,
to establish the fact of residence, he should be held to be unlawfully
within the United States.
Id. (Field, J., dissenting).
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policymaking evolution. Unlike past methods, such as the Bertillon
system, modern iterations embrace biometric ID cybersurveillance.
B. Biometric Identification and Immigration Vetting after the Chinese
Exclusion Act
At the turn of the century, there was a great national debate on
immigration that went beyond the exclusion of the Chinese. Through
publications of essays such as The Control of Trends in the Racial
Composition of the American People and other academic discussions,
immigration policy debates focused on “Old Stock” or “Native Stock”
Americans—Western and Northern Europeans—and “New Stock” or
“Immigrant Stock” Americans—Southern and Eastern Europeans.121 The
census statistics of 1910 and 1920 showed a dramatic rise in “New
Stock” Americans.122 “Between 1900 and 1910 the origin of the
American people, as between old and new stock, passed below the fifty
percent line.”123 The results of the 1910 census were published in
1913.124 Congress responded with several immigration reform bills in the
1920s. The Quota Act of 1921125 and National Origins Act of 1924126
were designed to restrict the number of immigrants allowed from
Central, Southern, and Eastern Europe, and set the quota for immigrants
from East, South, Southeast, and Central Asia and all other “Oriental
countries” at nearly zero.127 The “quota” system of federal immigration
policy was not lifted until 1965.128
In the 1920s and 1930s, the Chinese population of the United States
plummeted.129 There was a sharp rise, however, in immigrants from
Eastern and Southern Europe. In 1939, Pennsylvania passed an “Alien
Registration Act,” which required that every immigrant in the state
register with the state annually, “provide such information as is required
by the statute,” and pay an annual registration fee.130 In addition, the
121. Harry H. Laughlin, The Control of Trends in the Racial Composition of the
American, in THE ALIEN IN OUR MIDST 158 (Madison Grant & Chas. Stewart Davison
eds., 1930).
122. Id. at 159–60.
123. Id. at 159.
124. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THIRTEENTH CENSUS U.S. TAKEN IN YEAR 1910
(1913).
125. Emergency Quota Act of 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (1921).
126. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (also known as the Johnson–
Reed Act, and including the National Origins Act and Asian Exclusion Act).
127. HING, supra note 17, at 68–69 (2004).
128. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911.
129. See, e.g., HING, supra note 17, at 42.
130. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 59 (1941) (citing 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§
1801–06).
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Pennsylvania law required that the immigrant “receive an alien
identification card and carry it all times; show the card whenever it may
be demanded by any police officer or any agent of the Department of
Labor and Industry; and exhibit the card as a condition precedent to
registering a motor vehicle in his name or obtaining a license to operate
one.”131 Failure to register could result in “a fine of not more than $100
or imprisonment for not more than 60 days.”132 Failure to carry or show
the card “upon proper demand” could result in “a fine of not more than
$10, or imprisonment for not more than 10 days, or both.”133 Shortly
thereafter, in Hines v. Davidowitz,134 the Supreme Court struck down the
Pennsylvania law on preemption grounds, finding that the state statute
interfered with the exclusive power of the federal government to regulate
“the rights, privileges, obligations or burdens of aliens[.]”135
Congress followed Pennsylvania in the enactment of the Alien
Registration Act of 1940.136 Congress utilized the most advanced
biometric technology available at the time in developing a national
registration program for immigrants. The national identity registry
required the fingerprinting of nearly 5 million foreign nationals during
World War II.137 Database sorting technology made possible through the
U.S. Census Bureau’s usage of the Hollerith machine, combined with the
alien registration protocol, allowed for the identification of JapaneseAmericans for internment purposes.138
After the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, state and local
governments began enacting laws and ordinances targeting Japanese
Americans and immigrants from Japan residing in the United States.139
Subsequently, Executive Order 9,066, signed by President Roosevelt in
1942,140 ordered the internment of approximately 112,000 Japanese
Americans; a majority of them, an estimated 70,000, were U.S.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 59–60.
133. Id. at 60.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 63–64.
136. Alien Registration (Smith) Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940).
137. Will Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56
COLUM. L. REV. 309, 338 (1956) (“In 1940, the Alien Registration Act required every
alien fourteen years of age or older to be fingerprinted and to disclose the essential facts
about his immigration status. As a result, 4,800,000 aliens registered.”).
138. See, e.g., GARFINKEL supra note 32, at 17–18; Haya El Nasser, Papers Show
Census Role in WWII Camps, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2007, 1:33 AM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-03-30-census-role_N.htm
[https://perma.cc/SF93-CSCY].
139. See, e.g., Yamamoto, supra note 139 at 100–01.
140. Executive Order 9,066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942); See also
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943); Yamamoto, supra note 139.
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citizens.141 This same database technology and protocol was used to
identify Italian-Americans and German-Americans as well. During
World War II, over 600,000 Italian-born and 300,000 German-born
United States resident aliens and their families were mandated to carry
Certificates of Identification.142
After World War II, there was a consensus that the United States
needed a comprehensive and uniform immigration regulation policy.143
On September 4, 1952, President Truman appointed the President’s
Commission on Immigration and Naturalization to make
recommendations “designed to eliminate from our immigration laws the
unfortunate provisions which apply discriminations based on national
origin, race, creed and color; and to substitute provisions worthy of our
people and our form of government.”144
C. Biometric Identification under Extreme Vetting Protocols
Expanding upon past immigration and citizenship identification
protocols, in the aftermath of the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, the
newly-created U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has been
developing technologically advanced forms of screening and vetting.
These new DHS vetting protocols are based on sources that include
DHS-published materials describing current refugee vetting processes
and interviews with experts familiar with the refugee vetting protocols
established under the Obama Administration.145 Extreme vetting will
entail biometric database screening and other enhanced database
screening protocols.146 Currently, immigration-related vetting protocols
141. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 241–42 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting). (“It seems incredible that under these circumstances it would have been
impossible to hold loyalty hearing for the mere 112,000 persons involved—or at least for
the 70,000 American citizens—especially when a large part of this number represented
children and elderly men and women.”).
142. Wartime Treatment Study Act, S. 621, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007).
143. U.S. IMMIGRATION IN THE 1980S: REAPPRAISAL AND REFORM 3 (David
Simcox ed., 1988).
144. Special Message to the Congress Transmitting Report of the President's
Commission on Immigration and Naturalization, 1952–1953 PUB. PAPERS 1169, 1170
(1953) http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14387&st=Special+Message+
to+the+Congress+Transmitting+Report+of+the+President%5C%27s+Commission+on+I
mmigration+and+Naturalization&st1= [https://perma.cc/9TYS-56DH].
145. See generally Office of Biometric Identity Management, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/obim [https://perma.cc/ZH3C-F8WZ].
146. See, e.g., Exec. Order, Oct. 27, Enhanced Vetting; see also Ann M.
Simmons, We Don't Know Exactly What 'Extreme Vetting' Will Look Like, But Screening
For Refugees Is Already Pretty Tough, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-fg-refugees-screening-20170129-story.html
[https://perma.cc/46PY-NW2K].
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often begin with biographic identification—for example, in-person
interviews combined with screening paper documents such as birth
certificates, travel and work visas, passports, and other governmentissued documents;147 as well as biometric identification—for example,
the collection and database screening of scanned fingerprints and irises,
digital photographs for facial recognition technology, and DNA.148
Biometric data collection occurs at the earliest stages of refugee
vetting. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
recommends qualified refugees to the United States and other
cooperating countries for resettlement and is tasked with conducting the
initial assessment of whether an applicant qualifies for refugee status
under international laws.149 UNHCR “collects identity documents [such
as visas and passports, if available], biographical information, and
biometric data, such as iris scans for Syrians.”150 DHS also reportedly
collects DNA at specific refugee camps.151
Experts have explained that refugees are subjected to a “21-step
screening process.”152 The vetting protocols for refugees are described by
experts as already “extreme” and “among the most rigorous for anyone
seeking to enter the United States.”153 Once referred by UNHCR for
refugee resettlement in the United States, applicants are referred to
support centers, contracted by the U.S. Department of State to compile
and process refugee’s personal data.154 The U.S. Department of State

147. See Refugee Processing and Security Screening, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening [https://perma.cc/2BHSP696].
148. Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 1.
149. Simmons, supra note 146.
150. Id.
151. Shane Bauer, The FBI is Very Excited About This Machine That Can Scan
Your DNA in 90 Minutes, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 20, 2014, 11:30 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/11/rapid-dna-profiles-database-fbi-police
[https://perma.cc/7ZTU-C63B] (“The US government will soon test the [Rapid-DNA]
machine in refugee camps in Turkey and possibly Thailand on families seeking asylum in
the United States, according to Chris Miles, manager of the Department of Homeland
Security's biometrics program.”).
152. Del Quentin Wilber & Brian Bennett, Federal Agents are Reinvestigating
Syrian Refugees in U.S. Who May Have Slipped through Vetting Lapse, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
25, 2017, 9:55 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-syria-refugees-vetting-gap20170125-story.html [https://perma.cc/9D4L-CERE].
153. Id. See also Simmons, supra note 146; Interview by John Burnett of Leon
Rodriguez, Former Head of Dep’t of Homeland Security’s Immigration Serv., in All
Things Considered: Former Immigration Director Defends U.S. Record on Refugee
Vetting (NPR Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.npr.org/2017/02/03/513311323/formerimmigration-director-defends-u-s-record-on-refugee-vetting
[https://perma.cc/PG9KXCL6].
154. Simmons, supra note 146.
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checks the refugee’s name against digital watchlisting systems operated
by the military and the intelligence communities.155 The National
Counterterrorism Center conducts interagency checks, such as for

155. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., supra note 147. DHS explains
that the following State Department checks are involved in refugee vetting protocols:
The Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS):
§ State initiates CLASS name checks for all refugee applicants when
they are being prescreened by an RSC. Name checks are conducted on
the applicant’s primary names as well as any variations used by the
applicant. Responses are received before the USCIS interview, and
possible matches are reviewed and adjudicated by USCIS
headquarters. Evidence of the response is included in the case file. If a
new name or variation is identified at the interview, USCIS requests
another CLASS name check on the new name and places the case on
hold until that response is received.
§ CLASS is owned by State. The name-check database provides access
to critical information for adjudicating immigration applications. The
system contains records provided by numerous agencies and includes
information on individuals who have been denied visas, immigration
violations, criminal histories, and terrorism concerns, as well as
intelligence information and child support enforcement data.
§ In addition to containing information from State sources, CLASS also
includes information from:
National Counterterrorism Center/Terrorist Screening
Center (terrorist watch lists);
TECS;
Interpol;
Drug Enforcement Administration;
Health and Human Services; and
FBI (extracts of the National Crime Information Center’s
Wanted Persons File, Immigration Violator File, Foreign
Fugitive File, Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization
File (and the Interstate Identification Index)).
Security Advisory Opinion (SAO):
State initiates SAO name checks for certain refugee applicants when
they are being prescreened by an RSC. The SAO biographic check is
conducted by the FBI and intelligence community partners. SAOs are
conducted for an applicant who is a member of a group or nationality
that the U.S. government has designated as requiring this higher level
check. SAOs are processed, and a response must be received before
finalizing the decision. If there is a new name or variation identified at
the interview, USCIS requests another SAO for the new name and
places the case on hold until that response is received.
The SAO process was implemented after September 11th, 2001, to provide an additional
security mechanism to screen individuals in certain higher-risk categories who are
seeking to enter the United States through a variety of means, including refugee
applicants. Id.
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military-age males, to determine if “derogatory information” disqualifies
the applicant.156
The results of those checks are passed along to the DHS Office of
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, which assigns officers to
travel to foreign countries to interview the refugees to assess the
applicant’s credibility.157 The screening process includes background
security clearance checks through an Interagency Check158 and an inperson interview with the DHS Office of U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services.159
In addition to extensive interviews, the applicant’s fingerprints and
digital photographs are screened. Fingerprints of the applicant, for
example, are screened through intelligence and military databases
operated by the FBI, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the
Department of Defense, and other databases.160 The applicant is also
156. Id.
157. Wilber & Bennett, supra note 152.
158. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., supra note 147. DHS explains
that the Interagency Check protocol involves prescreening by intelligence community
partners:
Interagency Check (IAC):
The IAC screens biographic data, including names, dates of birth, and
other additional data of all refugee applicants within designated age
ranges. This information is captured at the time the applicant is
prescreened and is provided to intelligence community partners. This
screening procedure began in 2008 and has expanded over time to
include a broader range of applicants and records. These checks occur
throughout the process.
Id.
159.
Id.
160.
DHS explains that the following biometric database screening is involved
in refugee vetting protocols:
At the time of USCIS interview, USCIS staff collects fingerprints and begins
biometric checks. These checks include:
§
FBI Fingerprint Check through Next Generation Identification (NGI);
Recurring biometric record checks pertaining to criminal
history and previous immigration data.
§
DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT - f/n/a USVISIT);
A biometric record check related to travel and immigration
history as well as immigration violations, and law enforcement
and national security concerns. Enrollment in IDENT also
allows U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to confirm
the applicant’s identity at U.S. ports of entry; and
§
DOD Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency (DFBA)’s Automated
Biometric Identification System (ABIS).
A biometric record check of the Department of Defense’s
(DOD) records collected in areas of conflict.
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screened through various medical tests to ensure that he or she is free of
any communicable diseases.161 “Syrian refugees referred for resettlement
in the United States face additional screening.162 Only then is the
applicant’s status conditionally approved for resettlement and submitted
to the U.S. State Department for final processing.”163
If the applicant is able to pass security and medical screening, the
refugee is approved for resettlement. According to U.S. State Department
data, the entire screening process takes at least 18 months to two years.164
John Sandweg, former DHS Acting General Counsel and former DHS
Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, explained
that it was difficult for him to conceive of how the vetting protocols
could be made more rigorous by the Trump administration, given the
rigorousness of the present system.165
Importantly, Sandweg described the vetting procedures in place as
involving the efforts of multiple intelligence agencies, U.S. Department
of Defense, and other law enforcement databases at the federal and state
level. He stated, “‘There are individuals who are collecting information
on the battlefield, from sources and electronic intercepts. That is all fed
into the refugee screening process[.]’”166 DHS specifies that vetting of
refugees includes “[a] biometric record check of the [U.S.] Department
of Defense’s (DOD) records collected in areas of conflict (predominantly
Iraq and Afghanistan). DOD screening began in 2007 for Iraqi applicants
and has now been expanded to all nationalities.”167
DHS explains that vetting uses both classified and unclassified
databases for biometric and biographic screening, corroborating that
vetting involves intelligence tools.168 Specifically, according to one
media report, “U.S. intelligence agents cross-check[] refugees’ names
and biographical information against CIA databases[.]”169 Database
screening systems “automatically inspect data contained in ‘attachments’
to the records, the officials said. Such attachments can include cellphone
numbers, address books, social media postings, arrest reports and

Id.
161. Simmons, supra note 146.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERV., supra note 147.
168. Id. (“CBP’s [DHS Customs and Border Patrol] National Targeting CenterPassenger (NTC-P) conducts biographic vetting of all ABIS biometric matches against
various classified and unclassified U.S. government databases.”)
169. Wilber & Bennett, supra note 152.
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intelligence assessments[.]”170 Thus, United States law enforcement and
intelligence officials screen individuals through the classified databases
of the CIA, FBI, and National Counterterrorism Center; the military
databases of the U.S. Department of Defense; and the civilian databases
of the U.S. Department of State and DHS.171
It is worth noting that the vetting protocols involve continuous
monitoring, and tracking of the refugee even persists after the applicant
is approved for entry. The refugee faces additional interviews and
screening upon entry to the United States. “‘The individuals are
recurrently vetted even after they are in the United States,’ Sandweg
said. ‘You are constantly running them through a database to see if any
new information has come in to say that they are a threat.’”172
In this sense, a registry of sorts already exists insofar as, once a
refugee enters the surveillance system, they get no exit. Nevertheless, the
Trump administration envisions something more expansive. On
November 15, 2016, an immigration adviser to then-President-Elect
Donald Trump explained to Reuters News Service that the incoming
administration was considering the development of a Muslim “database”
or “registry” of Muslim immigrants residing in the United States.173
According to the media report: “Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach,
who helped write tough immigration laws in Arizona [Arizona’s SB
1070] and elsewhere, said in an interview that Trump’s policy advisers
had also discussed drafting a proposal for his consideration to reinstate a
registry for immigrants from Muslim countries.”174 The reinstatement of
a Muslim registry or Muslim database screening system was a reference
to a discontinued Bush Administration program named the “National
Security Entry-Exit Registration System,” a biometric database screening
system that collected the scanned fingerprints and digital photographs of
Muslim immigrants.175

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Simmons, supra note 146.
173. Mica Rosenberg & Julia Edwards Ainsley, Immigration Hardliner Says
Trump Team Preparing Plans for Wall, Mulling Muslim Registry, REUTERS (Nov. 15,
2016,
7:45
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-immigrationidUSKBN13B05C?feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews&utm_source=Twitter&ut
m_medium=Social [https://perma.cc/4AWV-38SK].
174. Id.
175. National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(2002),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2002/natlsecentryexittrackingsys.htm
[https://perma.cc/3S5J-GXSU].
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II. IMPLEMENTING CRIMMIGRATION-COUNTERTERRORISM THROUGH
THE MUSLIM BAN, THE TRAVEL BAN, AND EXTREME VETTING
A. The Muslim Ban
Then-candidate Trump’s original call for a “Muslim Ban” occurred
on December 7, 2015, following terrorist attacks in Paris and San
Bernardino, when he published a “Statement on Preventing Muslim
Immigration” on his campaign website.176 The statement explained that
Trump was “calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims
entering the United States until our country’s representatives can figure
out what is going on.”177
The Muslim Ban, as initially proposed during the campaign, was
intended to prohibit any Muslim from entering the United States.178
Trump subsequently explained that it would be a temporary ban, which
would permit the government to execute an assessment of immigration
procedures, and “suspend immigration from regions linked with
terrorism . . . ”179 He also argued that surveillance of Muslims and
mosques was necessary, linking domestic surveillance and foreign
vetting as one integral policy.180
In response to challenges that banning individuals from entry to the
United States based on religion was inconsistent with the Constitution,
then-candidate Trump suggested that it would instead be based on
territory.181 In an interview with NBC’s Meet the Press, Trump explained
that, “We must immediately suspend immigration from any nation that
has been compromised by terrorism until such time as proven vetting
176. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 575 (4th Cir.
2017) (en banc); see also Fred Barbash, Muslim Ban Language Suddenly Disappears
from Trump Campaign Website After Spicer Questioned, WASH. POST (May 9, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/05/09/trumps-preventingmuslim-immigration-vow-disappears-from-campaign-website-after-spicerquestioned/?utm_term=.2411d4837bec [https://perma.cc/7JHW-LFW8].
177. Barbash, supra note 176. (Statement of Donald J. Trump, on Preventing
Muslim Immigration (Dec. 7, 2015)). The statement was available on the campaign
website until shortly before oral argument before the Fourth Circuit in International
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at
575 n.5.
178. Id.
179. Associated Press, How Donald Trump’s Plan to Ban Muslims Has Evolved,
FORTUNE (June 28, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/28/donald-trump-muslim-ban/
[https://perma.cc/7VVE-QCKU].
180. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 576; see also David Mark &
Jeremy Diamond, Trump: ‘I Want Surveillance of Certain Mosques’, CNN (Nov. 21,
2015, 7:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/21/politics/trump-muslims-surveillance/
[https://perma.cc/Y5AS-UASF].
181. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 576.
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mechanisms have been put in place.”182 Trump stated that the shift to
nation-based exclusion was an “expansion” and that he was “talking
territory instead of Muslim.”183 Thus, even as the proposed policy
purportedly shifted to more defensible legal grounds—targeting specific
countries rather than an entire religion based on a country-by-country
risk assessment—rhetorically broadened the divide, encompassing not
only Muslims, but also their associates residing in countries subject to
Islamic influence. In this way, the proposed ban continued to be
animated by—while also animating—cultural phobia of Muslims.
In a further expansion of his arguments for stricter scrutiny of
immigrants, candidate Trump announced a proposal for “extreme
vetting” during a campaign speech in August 2016.184 He explained that,
“In the Cold War, we had an ideological screening test. The time is
overdue to develop a new screening test for the threats we face today. I
call it extreme vetting.”185 As a candidate, Trump also endorsed a
“biometric entry-exit system for tracking visa-holders.”186
B. The Travel Ban
In his first week in office, President Trump signed three Executive
Orders that implemented various aspects of immigration-related
campaign promises that had been articulated prior to his election. On
January 25, 2017, President Trump issued two Executive Orders titled,
“Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements,
Executive Order 13,767,”187 and “Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior
of the United States, Executive Order 13,768.”188 The former stated that
it was “the policy of the executive branch to . . . secure the southern
182. Meet the Press - July 24, 2016, NBC NEWS (July 24, 2016, 11:47 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-july-24-2016-n615706
[https://perma.cc/DH2W-5UHJ].
183. Id.
184. Donald J. Trump, Remarks at Youngstown State University in Youngstown,
Ohio (August 15, 2016) (transcript by Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, The American
Presidency
Project,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=119503
[https://perma.cc/8NBQ-8B9U].
185. Id.
186. Emily Schultheis, Donald Trump Doubles Down in Immigration Speech:
“Mexico Will Pay for the Wall”, CBS NEWS (Aug. 31, 2016, 10:06 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-delivers-immigration-speech-in-phoenix/
[https://perma.cc/ZF7E-X2FE].
187. Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, Exec. Order
No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 18, 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Exec. Order, Jan. 30,
Border Security].
188. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order
No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 18, 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Exec. Order, Jan. 30,
Interior Public Safety].
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border of the United States through the immediate construction of a
physical wall” between the United States and Mexico.189 The latter
threatened the loss of federal funding for “sanctuary” jurisdictions, those
state and local governments refusing to cooperate with the federal
government in the detention and deportation of undocumented
immigrants. 190
Two days later, on January 27, 2017, President Trump issued a third
Executive Order, Executive Order 13,769, promulgating immigration
policy, titled, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into
the United States.”191 The January 27, 2017, Order barred the admission
of all refugees to the United States for 120 days,192 and excluded
immigration from seven countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria, and Yemen.193 It indefinitely suspended refugees from Syria.194
Further, it asserted that immigration from those countries was
“detrimental to the interests of the United States” and suspended
immigration from those countries for ninety days while visa protocols
were scrutinized.195
Trump explained in a television interview on the Christian
Broadcasting Network that the January 27, 2017, Order would afford
greater protection to Christians.196 Specifically, the Executive Order
stated that prioritization would be granted to refugee applicants seeking
relief from religious-based persecution if they demonstrated that they
were among the religious minority in the Muslim-majority countries
impacted by the Order.197 The Order further lowered the refugee cap in
2017 to 50,000 refugees, down from the 85,000 refugee cap set by the
Obama Administration for 2016.198 State and local jurisdictions also
enjoyed an expanded role in the process of refugee resettlement under
the Order,199 likely in response to multiple lawsuits brought by states
seeking to prevent the resettlement of Syrian refugees in those states,

189. Exec. Order, Jan. 30, Border Security at 8793.
190. Exec. Order, Jan. 30, Interior Public Safety at 8801.
191. Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I.
192. Id. at 8979.
193. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II.
194. Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I at 8979.
195. Id. at 8978.
196. See, e.g., Daniel Burke, Trump Says US Will Prioritize Christian Refugees,
CNN, (Jan. 30, 2017, 11:28 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/trumpchristian-refugees/ [https://perma.cc/MBB4-7S99].
197. Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I at 8979.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 8980
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including a lawsuit involving then-Governor Mike Pence’s efforts to bar
Syrian refugees from the state of Indiana.200
In response to ongoing litigation that had temporarily suspended the
January 27, 2017, Order,201 on March 6, 2017, President Trump reissued
this Executive Order, Executive Order 13,780, under the same title,
“Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States” (“March 6, 2017, Order”).202 The March 6, 2017, Order was more
limited, and significantly modified the provisions that had restricted
travel and refugee relief. The revised Order no longer included Iraq,203
thereby restricting travel by citizens from six countries: Iran, Libya,
Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.204 The March 6, 2017, Order no
longer indefinitely suspended refugee relief for Syrian refugees, and
instead subjected Syrian refugees to the provision of the order that bars
admission of all refugees to the United States for 120 days.205 In addition,
it did not offer refugee relief preferences on the basis of minority
religious persecution.206 The March 6, 2017, Order expressly identified
those who would not face a “suspension of entry” pursuant to the order,
including: lawful permanent residents,207 dual nationals,208 diplomats,209
and those who had been granted valid visas,210 and asylum or refugee
status prior to implementation of the order.211
The revised March 6, 2017, Order, like the original, stated that
temporarily suspending refugee relief and banning travel into the United
States by nationals and citizens of the “countries of concern” would
allow time to develop more stringent vetting procedures.212 It explained
that the “countries of concern” were previously identified in the Visa
Waiver Program, enacted in 2015 through the Visa Waiver Program
Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act.213 The March 6, 2017,
Order specified that “[u]niform [s]creening and [v]etting [s]tandards for
200. See Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence, 838 F.3d 902, 902 (7th Cir.
2016).
201. See supra notes 27–31 and accompanying text.
202. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II.
203. Id. at 13211–12
204. Id. at 13210–11
205. Id. at 13215.
206. Id. at 13210.
207. Id. at 13213.
208. Id. at 13213–14.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. 13209–11, 13215; see also Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I.
213. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II at 13209 (citing Visa Waiver Program
Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114–13 § 203,
129 Stat. 2988–91 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12) (D)(ii)(Supp. III 2015))).
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all [i]mmigration [p]rograms” would be developed by DHS, the U.S.
Department of State, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence.214 A revised screening process “could
include holding more in-person interviews, searches of an expanded
database of identity documents or longer application forms.”215 The
March 6, 2017, Order further explained that expanded vetting and
screening procedures would attempt to assess “malicious intent” and
implement a “mechanism to assess whether [visa] applicants may
commit, aid, or support any kind of violent, criminal, or terrorist acts.”216
In contrast, the January 27, 2017, Order specifically stated that its
purpose was to include an assessment of the ideological and
constitutional posture of immigrants through extreme vetting:
In order to protect Americans, the United States must ensure
that those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes
toward it and its founding principles. The United States cannot,
and should not, admit those who do not support the
Constitution, or those who would place violent ideologies over
American law.217
The March 6, 2017, Order did not include this language, however,
the screening and vetting requirements set forth in Section 5 of the Order
was more expansive and ambiguous. For instance, instead of focusing on
constitutional ideology, Section 5 of the Order cast a wide pre-crime net,
stating that the screening and vetting standards would analyze, amongst
other concerns, a “risk of causing harm.”218
The March 6, 2017, Order maintained several important provisions
that were articulated in the January 27, 2017 version. Both asserted that
restricting travel from the identified countries was “detrimental to the
interests of the United States” and suspended immigration from those
countries for ninety days while visa protocols were scrutinized.219 Both
lowered the refugee cap in 2017 to 50,000 refugees, down from 85,000
refugee cap set by the Obama Administration for 2016.220 As in the
original, the March 6, 2017, Order ensured that state and local
214.
215.

Id. at 13215.
Reuters, Here’s What Trump’s Order on Extreme Vetting Includes,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2017, 12:19 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/hereswhat-trumps-order-on-extreme-vetting-includes-2017-1 [https://perma.cc/W74H-S24U].
216. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II at 13215.
217. Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I at 8977.
218. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II at 13215.
219. Id. at 13213; see Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I at 82.
220. Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I at 8978; Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban
II at 13216.
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jurisdictions enjoy an expanded role in the process of refugee
resettlement.221 This is likely in response to multiple lawsuits attempting
to overturn state bans on the resettlement of Syrian refugees in those
states.222
A full legal analysis of the Travel Ban cases extends beyond the
scope of this Article. At the time of publication, the litigation remains
ongoing and executive actions surrounding the Travel Ban and extreme
vetting are dynamic; however, a cursory overview of recent
developments is as follows. On September 24, 2017, the ninety-day entry
suspension in Section 2(c) of the March 6, 2017, Order expired. In
response, the President issued a Proclamation, pursuant to Section 2(e) of
the March 6, 2017 Order. Consequently, on September 24, 2017, the
travel restrictions and the vetting requirements were expanded in a third
iteration of the Travel Ban, titled, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and
Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the United States by
Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats.”223 President Trump signed
this new Proclamation (the “September 24, 2017, Proclamation”)224
before oral arguments were scheduled for the U.S. Supreme Court in the
consolidated Travel Ban cases of Trump v. Hawaii and Trump v.
International Refugee Assistance Project.225
Solicitor General Noel Francisco claimed that the executive action
“was issued after the completion of a worldwide review conducted under
Section 2(a) of the [March 6, 2017] Order to determine what additional
information (if any) is needed from each foreign country to assess
whether that country’s nationals who seek to enter the United States pose
a security or safety threat.”226 Furthermore, Solicitor General Francisco
characterized the September 24, 2017, Proclamation as “impos[ing]
certain conditional restrictions on entry into the United States of
nationals of a small number of countries”227 due to “the President’s
findings regarding those countries’ information-sharing capabilities and
practices and other serious terrorism-related risks the countries
present.”228 The September 24, 2017, Proclamation was set to go into
effect on October 18, 2018. On October 17, 2017, significant parts of the
221.

Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I at 8980; Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban

II.
222. See, e.g., Exodus Refugee Immigration, Inc. v. Pence, 838 F.3d 902, 903–04
(7th Cir. 2016).
223. Proclamation, Sept. 24, Travel Ban III.
224. Proclamation, Sept. 24, Travel Ban III.
225. 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017).
226. Letter from U.S. Solicitor Noel General Francisco to the Clerk of the
Supreme Court, dated September 24, 2017.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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September 24, 2017, Proclamation were enjoined by the Districts of
Hawaii and Maryland in Hawaii v. Trump229 and International Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump,230 respectively.
The September 24, 2017, Proclamation differs from the prior
Orders. The March 6, 2017, Order fully replaced the January 27, 2017,
Order. The September 24, 2017, Proclamation, however, supplements the
March 6, 2017, Order. Importantly, the September 24, 2017,
Proclamation shifts the focus away from an Entry Ban or a Travel Ban
and emphasizes more clearly the vetting and screening provisions set
forth by the prior Orders. The Proclamation and other executive action
now makes clear that extreme vetting must be understood as part of a
web of biometric and biographic tracking technologies that DHS has
termed “identity management.”231
The March 6, 2017, Order left the extreme vetting provisions of the
January 27, 2017, Order in place.232 The vetting requirements were
expanded in several respects,233 and most fully articulated in Section 5,
titled “Implementing Uniform Screening and Vetting Standards for All
Immigration Programs.”234 Sections 1(a) through (h) of the September
24, 2017, Proclamation expands extreme vetting even further. The
September 24, 2017, Proclamation focuses its attention on “identitymanagement and information-sharing capabilities, protocols, and
practices” related to immigration screening and vetting.235
Additionally, the September 24, 2017, Proclamation instituted a
number of changes to the requirements that had been previously imposed
by the March 6, 2017, Order. Under the September 24, 2017,

229. Hawaii v. Trump, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171242 (D. Haw., Oct. 17, 2017).
230. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171879
(D. Md., Oct. 17, 2017).
231. See Proclamation, Sept. 24, Travel Ban III; Exec. Order, Oct. 27, Enhanced
Vetting. DHS offers this definition of identity management:
Identity Management (IdM) deals with identifying and managing individuals
within a government, state, local, public, or private sector network or
enterprise. In addition, authentication and authorization to access resources
such as facilities or, sensitive data within that system are managed by
associating user rights, entitlements, and privileges with the established
identity.
Cyber Security Division Identity Management Program Video, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND
SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/cyber-security-division-identitymanagement-program-video [https://perma.cc/F9KK-XVRE].
232. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II §§ 1–2; see also id. § 5 (“Implementing
Uniform Screening and Vetting Standards for All Immigration Programs”).
233. Compare id., with Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I § 4.
234. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II § 5.
235. Id.; see also supra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing U.S.
Department of Homeland Security definition of “identity management”).
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Proclamation, for example, Sudan nationals are no longer restricted from
entry.236 Immigrants who are nationals from seven nations are suspended
from entering indefinitely: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, Chad,
and North Korea.237 Of that group, only nationals from Chad and North
Korea were not subject to March 6, 2017, Order.238 However,
nonimmigrant entry of nationals from those seven countries is suspended
in varying degrees.239 Nonimmigrant nationals from North Korea and
Syria are suspended from entry.240 Nonimmigrant nationals from Iran can
enter in general, but not on business (B-1), tourist (B-2), or
business/tourist (B-1/B-2) visas.241
Some nationals from Venezuela are subject to this same suspension:
a number of officials, and their immediate family members, of
Venezuelan agencies that work in screening and vetting procedures, such
as the Ministry of the Popular Power for Interior, Justice and Peace; the
Administrative Service of Identification, Migration and Immigration; the
Scientific, Penal and Criminal Investigation Service Corps; the
Bolivarian National Intelligence Service; and the Ministry of the Popular
Power for Foreign Relations.242 Other nationals from Venezuela who
have visas have to comply with additional measures to maintain their
traveler information.243
Nationals from Somalia are subject to “additional scrutiny”
regarding issuance of visas and permission to enter “to determine if
applicants are connected to terrorist organizations or otherwise pose a
threat to the national security or public safety of the United States.”244
The September 24, 2017, Proclamation defines “immigrant” as someone
who enters subject to an immigrant visa who becomes a lawful
permanent resident once in the United States.245 Furthermore, before it
was enjoined, the Proclamation was to take effect on October 18, 2017,
except for those who were already subject to Section 2(c) of the March 6,
2017, Order—namely, nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and
Yemen—for whom the September 24, 2017, Proclamation had an
immediate effect.246

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

See Proclamation, Sept. 24, Travel Ban III.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The January 27, 2017, and March 6, 2017, Orders mandated
immediate completion of the “Biometric Entry-Exit Tracking System” by
DHS,247 a system with the stated aim of tracking foreign visitors’ arrival
and departure from United States airports, borders, and other ports of
entry by screening biometric data through government databases.248 The
Obama Administration had previously announced that it would aim to
implement biometric exit checks at the largest airports in the nation
by 2018.249 Some experts have explained that system risks limited
efficacy unless it is extended to all land, air, and sea ports of entry,250 and
unless it includes biometric data on all those residing in the United
States, both citizens and noncitizens.251 “According to a 2014 report from
the Bipartisan Policy Center the system would be expensive to
implement and would ‘offer mixed value for enforcement objectives.’”252
Section 5 of the March 6, 2017, Order suggested pre-crime
objectives, stating that the screening and vetting standards will analyze,
for example, the “risk of causing harm.”253 The September 24, 2017,
Proclamation expands the ambiguity of the objectives of the screening
and vetting protocols. In section 1(a) of the September 24, 2017,
Proclamation, it states that the purpose is “to protect its citizens from
terrorist attacks and other public-safety threats. Screening and vetting
protocols and procedures associated with visa adjudications and other
immigration processes play a critical role in implementing that
policy.”254 Repeatedly, the September 24, 2017, Proclamation refers to

247. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II, at 13216; see also Exec. Order, Jan. 27,
Travel Ban I, at 8980.
248. See, e.g., Why is the Biometric Exit Tracking System Still Not in Place?:
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Immigration and Nat’l Interest, Comm. on the
Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1 (2016) (Anh Duong, Director, Borders and Maritime Security
Division, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Craig Healy, Assistant Director, National
Security Investiations Division, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security and John Wagner,
Deputy Asst. Comm’r, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security),
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=789646 [https://perma.cc/7MWE-DWP5] (written
testimony).
249. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., COMPREHENSIVE
BIOMETRIC ENTRY/EXIT PLAN, FISCAL YEAR 2016 REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 18 (2016),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Customs%20and%20Border%20Prot
ection%20-%20Comprehensive%20Biometric%20Entry%20and%20Exit%20Plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YS7Y-WPEM].
250. See Implementation of an Entry-Exit System: Still Waiting After All These
Years: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg85565/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg85565.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7KT7-URZA].
251. See, e.g., Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 1, at 1541.
252. Reuters, supra note 215.
253. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II § 5(a).
254. Proclamation, Sept. 24, Travel Ban III.
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“identity management” systems and protocols. Multiple additional
challenges to the September 24, 2017, Proclamation have ensued, and a
new Executive Order addressing enhanced vetting was announced on
October 24, 2017.255
C. Biometric ID Cybersurveillance and Algorithmic Screening Tools as
Big Data Proxies for Race and Other Classifications Under the Travel
Ban and Extreme Vetting Protocols
On a practical programmatic level, identity management systems are
coterminous with biometric identification systems.256 “Extreme vetting”
or “enhanced vetting” will likely entail biometric database screening and
other enhanced database screening protocols that rely upon biometric
data as an identifying data anchor point257 or data backbone for multiple
screening and vetting systems.258 Clarifying how biometric technology
may be used for surveillance is therefore essential to understand the role
of biometric cybersurveillance and algorithmic tools in extreme vetting
programs, as well as their possible abuse as proxies in big data
surveillance and screening.

255. At the time of publication, multiple complaints have been filed to challenge
the Proclamation. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 26–27,
Iranian Alliances Across Borders, Univ. of Md. Coll. Park Chapter v. Trump, No. 8:17cv-02921-GJH (D. Md. Oct. 2, 2017) (seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the
Sept. 24, 2017, Proclamation, and alleging that the Proclamation violates the
antidiscrimination provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1152(a)(1)(A) (2012)); Letter from ACLU to Hon. Theodore D. Chuang, U.S. Dist. Ct.
for the Dist. of Md. (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/letter/irap-v-trump-pmc-letter
[https://perma.cc/8PR7-ZUCF] (seeking to amend the complaint in International Refugee
Assistance Project in light of the September 24, 2017, Proclamation); see also Complaint
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Brennan Ctr. for Justice N.Y. Univ. Sch. of
Law v. U.S. Dep’t. of State, No. 1:17-cv-07520 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2017) (seeking
disclosure of reports referred to in sections 1(c) and 1(h) of the September 24, 2017,
Proclamation, pursuant to the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)). On October 24, 2017, the White House issued a press release
announcing an Executive Order that implemented enhanced vetting procedures for
refugees. See Press Release, White House, Presidential Executive Order on Resuming the
United States Refugee Admissions Program with Enhanced Vetting Capabilities (Oct. 24,
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/10/24/presidential-executiveorder-resuming-united-states-refugee-admissions [https://perma.cc/JKD9-JJ9W]; see also
Exec. Order, Oct. 27, Enhanced Vetting.
256. DHS Office of Biometric Identity Management, supra note 145; see also
Hu, Biometric Cyberintelligence, supra note 1; Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 1.
257. See, e.g., Exec. Order, Oct. 27, Enhanced Vetting.
258. See generally Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 1 (discussing how biometrics
will increasingly be used by government programs to combat terrorism); see infra notes
259–66.
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Biometrics is “[t]he science of automatic identification or identity
verification of individuals using physiological or behavioral
characteristics.”259 Because such characteristics are unique to an
individual, they are often considered a “gold standard” method of
identity verification.260 Biometric identification and verification systems
can involve “hard” or “soft” biometrics.261 The difference between hard
and soft biometrics is “perceived reliability for automated identification
matching technologies.”262 Hard biometrics are traditional biometric
identifiers that serve “secure identification and personal verification
solutions.”263 Examples of hard biometrics include fingerprints, facial
recognition, iris scans, and DNA. Soft biometrics are “anatomical or
behavioral characteristic[s] that provide[] some information about the
identity of a person, but does not provide sufficient evidence to precisely
determine the identity.”264 Examples of soft biometric identifiers include
a digital analysis or automatic determination of age, height, weight, race
or ethnicity, skin and hair color, scars, birthmarks, and tattoos.265
Publicly available information, including information available
through the Freedom of Information Act, demonstrates that DHS is using
data technologies such as data fusion and algorithm-driven predictive
analytics.266 Although at this point in time, determining how extreme
vetting will be implemented is still speculative, publicly available
information suggests that extreme vetting will involve big data
259. JOHN R. VACCA, BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS
589 (2007); see also Margaret Hu, Biometric Surveillance and Big Data
Governance in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON SURVEILLANCE LAW 125–26 (David Gray and
Stephen Henderson, eds.) (2017) [hereinafter Hu, Biometric Surveillance].
260. Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 1, at 1537 n. 258 (citing Alan Gomez,
Immigrant Tracking May Impede Bill; Partisan Split Developing over Biometric Data on
Foreigners Leaving U.S., USA TODAY, May 9, 2013, at A5 (“[Former U.S. Secretary of
Homeland Security Michael] Chertoff calls [biometrics] the ‘gold standard.’”).
261. Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, supra note 2, at 661 n.287; Hu, Biometric
Surveillance, supra note 259.
262. Id.
263. See VACCA, supra note 259, at 57.
264. See Hu, Biometric Surveillance, supra note 259 (citing Karthik
Nandakumar & Anil K. Jain, Soft Biometrics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOMETRICS 1235,
1235 (Stan Z. Li & Anil Kumar Jain eds., 2009)).
265. Id. See also Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, supra note 2, at 125–26; Hu,
Biometric Surveillance, supra note 259.
266. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT
UPDATE FOR THE FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST)/PASSIVE
METHODS
FOR
PRECISION
BEHAVIORAL
SCREENING
5
(2011),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_st_fast-a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NVP4-HFN5]; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT FOR THE FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST) PROJECT 4
(2008),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_st_fast.pdf
[https://perma.cc/33M7-HLKH].
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technologies, analytics, database screening, monitoring social media, and
other cybersurveillance techniques.267
DHS has expanded its identity management initiatives, such as
biometric ID credentials and background checks, which includes mass
biometric data collection and analysis.268 Identity management as a
policy rationale is intended to facilitate governance decisions by
tethering risk to rights and privileges.269 Essentially, analytic
technologies can permit risk assessments based on data, which are then
linked to the individual’s digital and physical identity through
biometrics. This information then can be used to make determinations for
governance and security purposes.270 This effort to seize upon the body
via biometrics—and make it the locus for an ostensibly neutral and
objective analysis—has a history that should not be forgotten, no matter
how different biometric cybersurveillance is from its past variants.
III. UTILIZING CRITICAL THEORY TO INTERROGATE THE
DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT OF CRIMMIGRATION-COUNTERTERRORISM
Part I explored the historical genesis of “extreme vetting”: attempts
to enforce border security and interior enforcement of unwanted
migration through an increasing emphasis on biometric identification and
screening protocols. It described how, following the terrorist attacks of
September 11th, 2001, multiple advances in database screening and
algorithmic-driven screening now depend upon biometric data as a data
backbone for contemporary security vetting systems.
Part II discussed how the Muslim Ban morphed into a Travel Ban
before more firmly settling into an extreme vetting or enhanced vetting
policy mandate. Given the legal hurdles the Travel Ban has faced thus
far, it will likely morph again to target new groups further removed from
the traditional protected categories recognized under constitutional law,
such as race, national origin, ethnicity, gender, and religion. In addition,
as stated above, the federal courts have not yet had an opportunity to
assess the legal implications of extreme vetting.271 In this way, the longterm constitutional impact of the Travel Ban, namely, the impact of the
extreme vetting protocols and its progeny, is yet to be determined. Thus,
267. Interview by John Burnett, supra note 153. See, e.g., Hu, Algorithmic Jim
Crow, supra note 2; See also Notice of Modified Privacy Act System of Records, 82 Fed.
Reg. 179 (Sept. 18, 2017); 60-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection:
Supplemental Questions for Visa Applicants, 82 Fed. Reg. 148 (Aug. 3, 2017).
268. Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 1, at 1547–48.
269. Id. at 1489–90 (discussing identity management); Hu, Biometric
Cyberintelligence, supra note 1, at 737.
270. Hu, Biometric Cyberintelligence, supra note 1, at 737–38.
271. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 31, at 36–37.
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any federal court decision, to the extent that it focuses only on the Travel
Ban and excludes the vetting and screening protocols that may flow from
it, may be limited in its usefulness in an analysis of the discriminatory
reach of the Executive Orders and Proclamation.272
A. Parallels Between Travel Ban and Past Discrimination Under Rule of
Law: Chinese Exclusion Act and WWII Japanese-American Internment
Facially neutral terms and categories must be analyzed in the
context of their history and genealogy. The legal precedent that underlies
the Travel Ban has a genealogy that descends from the Chinese
Exclusion Act cases and Japanese internment cases of World War II. The
Chinese Exclusion Act cases are particularly instructive in demonstrating
phobias of foreign culture that the Court found threatened what the Court
appeared to suggest were ineffable “American” qualities of our society.
Both before and after President Trump issued the Executive Orders
intended to suspend travel from nationals of designated Muslim-majority
countries, commentators drew comparisons between the Travel Ban and
the Chinese Exclusion Act.273 Executive Orders 13,769 and 13,780 have
also drawn comparisons to the Japanese Internment Order, Executive
Order 9,066,274 particularly because as a candidate, Trump and other
advisors had cited President Roosevelt’s actions and Korematsu v.
United States275 as justification for both the Muslim Ban and a Muslim
database registry.276 Then-candidate Trump explained that, “What I’m
doing is no different than FDR,” to ABC News during the campaign.277
272. Id. See also Noferi & Koulish, supra note 5.
273. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Is the Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law?
(The President is Trying to Find Out), 1 NEV. L.J. FORUM 80, 80–81 (2017) (pointing out
the parallels between the Chinese Exclusion Case and the Travel Ban litigation); see also
Kat Chow, As Chinese Exclusion Act Turns 135, Experts Point To Parallels Today, NPR
(May
5,
2017,
6:06
PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/05/05/527091890/the-135-year-bridgebetween-the-chinese-exclusion-act-and-a-proposed-travel-ban
[https://perma.cc/A2SFQUR6]; David W. Dunlap, 135 Years Ago, Another Travel Ban Was in the News, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/17/insider/chinese-exclusionact-travel-ban.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/WM3V-ZD3J]; Chris Fuchs, The Parallel
Between Trump’s Immigration Ban and Past U.S. Anti-Asian Policies, NBC NEWS (Jan.
30, 2017, 10:25 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/some-trump-simmigration-ban-parallels-past-anti-asian-policies-n714091
[https://perma.cc/6KZAFULG]; Massoud Hayoun, A Chinese American Lesson for Trump, AL JAZEERA NEWS
(Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/01/chinese-americanlesson-trump-170130123606142.html [https://perma.cc/6V2W-MDLC].
274. Executive Order 9,066, 3 C.F.R.§ 1092 (1942).
275. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
276. See, e.g., Derek Hawkins, Japanese American Internment Is ‘Precedent’ for
National Muslim Registry, Prominent Trump Backer Says, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016),
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A former spokesman for the Great America Political Action
Committee, Carl Higbie, explained during an interview that a Muslim
database registry would be legal and “hold constitutional muster” based
on Korematsu.278 Like both the Chinese Exclusion Act, and Executive
Order 9,066 and the orders related to WWII Japanese-American
Internment, the Travel Ban Executive Orders were based on rationales
relating to national security.279 The Chinese Exclusion Acts relied on
congressional conclusions that Chinese laborers posed a threat to
communities.280 Executive Order 9,066 justified its decision to detain
individuals based on “every possible protection against espionage and
against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises,
and national defense utilities,”281 flowing from the President’s Executive
Branch authority as Commander in Chief.282 Executive Orders 13,769
and 13,780 were issued to “protect its citizens from terrorist attacks,
including those committed by foreign nationals. . . . [and] to improve the
screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with the visaissuance process and the USRAP.”283
The Court upheld the Chinese Exclusion Acts and the JapaneseAmerican Internment Order, Executive Order 9,066, on national security
grounds.284 The Court’s decision to vacate the case and remand it with
instructions to dismiss as moot means that the constitutionality of the
Travel Ban has yet to be determined; however, the Courts of Appeals
have expressed skepticism regarding the broad national security
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/11/17/japaneseinternment-is-precedent-for-national-muslim-registry-prominent-trump-backersays/?utm_term=.76ecd8dcec4a [https://perma.cc/2APA-87VU].
277. Meghan Keneally, Donald Trump Cites These FDR Policies to Defend
Muslim
Ban,
ABC
NEWS
(Dec.
8,
2015,
1:01
PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-cites-fdr-policies-defend-muslimban/story?id=35648128 [https://perma.cc/VP79-7LTB].
278. Hawkins, supra note 276.
279. See Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I (stating that the President was
issuing the Executive Order to “protect the American people from terrorist attacks by
foreign nationals admitted to the United Sates”); Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II
(explaining that the President was disseminating the new Order to “protect the Nation
from terrorist activities by foreign nationals admitted to the United States”).
280. See Chinese Exclusion Act, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (repealed 1943) (“Whereas
in the opinion of the Government of the United States the coming of Chinese laborers to
this country endangers the good order of certain localities within the territory thereof.”);
see also supra notes 34–120 (discussing the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Act).
281. Executive Order 9,066, 3 C.F.R. 1092, 1093 (1942).
282. Id.
283. Exec. Order, Mar. 6, Travel Ban II, at 13209. The first Executive Order, on
January 27, 2017, also used the quoted language. See Exec. Order, Jan. 27, Travel Ban I,
at 8977.
284. See supra notes 99–103.
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justifications suggested by the government to support the ban.285 National
security aims, as one of the governmental interests claimed to be among
the most important,286 typically enjoy generous deference by the judicial
branch. That reviewing courts have been skeptical despite a tradition of
national security deference to the executive is likely attributable to the
fraught precedent that appears to support such deference.287
Experts explain that the debates, which included racial arguments,
leading to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act stemmed from an
“assumption that the Chinese were a distinct race with a biologically
determined nature that was reflected in moral behavior, cultural
preferences, and physiological traits.”288 The parallels with contemporary
rhetoric about the danger posed by Muslims and the inevitable clash with
Western values are obvious. None of this is to deny the threat of
terrorism, but at the same time distinguishing that threat to the overblown
rhetoric it has engendered in the public sphere is essential.
Pulitzer Prize-winning columnist, Eugene Robinson of the
Washington Post, warns that the Muslim Ban and extreme vetting can
lead to what he refers to as a “special version of Jim Crow” for
Muslims.289 Then-Attorney General Sally Yates, in fact, explained in
media reports that her refusal to defend the January 27, 2017, Order
stemmed in part because she “thought back to Jim Crow laws.”290 All
U.S. citizens could logically be subjected to extreme vetting protocols, as
any citizen or noncitizen may pose a terroristic threat risk.291 In fact,
significantly, the original announcement of Trump’s Muslim Ban
indicated that the proposal was inclusive of U.S. citizens. In February
2016, retired General Lieutenant Michael Flynn, Trump’s former
campaign adviser on national security and former White House National
Security Adviser, stated on Twitter: “Fear of Muslims is
285. See Trump v. Hawaii, No. 16–1540, 2017 WL 4782860 (Oct. 24, 2017),
supra note 27; see generally Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017).
286. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 36 (2010).
287. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1994).
288. Calavita, supra note 26, at 11.
289. Eugene Robinson, Trump’s Special Version of Jim Crow – for Muslims,
WASH. POST (June 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-specialversion-of-jim-crow-for-muslims/2016/06/20/70fc1bd2-3721-11e6-8f7cd4c723a2becb_story.html [https://perma.cc/MB8F-UPCY]. See also Hu, Algorithmic Jim
Crow, supra note 2.
290. See also Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, supra note 2 at 14 n.55 (citing Ryan
Lizza, Why Sally Yates Stood Up to Trump, NEW YORKER (May 29, 2017),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/05/29/why-sally-yates-stood-up-to-trump
[https://perma.cc/JHF9-73DM]).
291. Id.
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RATIONAL.”292 During a speech in August 2016, Flynn characterized
Islamism as a “‘vicious cancer inside the body of 1.7 billion people’ that
has to be ‘excised[.]’”293 Although experts argue that a small minority of
Muslims have adopted radicalized Islamist views,294 according to
Robinson, “[i]n Trump’s eyes, however, all Muslims are suspect.”295
The original statement released by then-candidate Trump on the
Muslim Ban characterized “Shariah [sic]” as “authoriz[ing] such
atrocities as murder against non-believers who won’t convert,
beheadings and more unthinkable acts that pose great harm to
Americans, especially women.”296 The rhetoric was inflammatory,
magnifying the threat posed by international terrorism to encompass an
entire religion apparently inherently predisposed to attack Western
values. Similar to the rhetoric that led to the Chinese Exclusion Act and
the Japanese Internment, the rhetoric of the Muslim Ban separated
“them”—characterized as persons seeking to infiltrate and then terrorize
our society—from “us,” translating a real national security concern into
an authority to target uncomfortable cultural otherness.297
Consequently, the federal courts have been invited in the litigation
surrounding the Travel Ban to assess the government’s arguments that
the ban is facially neutral and non-discriminatory. As with the claims
raised in defense of the Chinese Exclusion Act and Japanese Internment,
the facially-neutral crimmigration-counterterrorism policy rationales
advanced by the administration in support of the Travel Ban are similar
to the national security policy rationales of the past.

292. Dana Priest & Greg Miller, He Was One of the Most Respected Intel
Officers of His Generation. Now He’s Leading ‘Lock Her Up’ Chants., WASH. POST
(Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nearly-theentire-national-security-establishment-has-rejected-trumpexcept-for-thisman/2016/08/15/d5072d96-5e4b-11e6-8e45477372e89d78_story.html?utm_term=.49b904ac60ba [https://perma.cc/7LB5-BT2R].
293. Andrew Kaczynski, Michael Flynn in August: Islamism a ‘Vicious Cancer’
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[https://perma.cc/T4VJ-AGJ3].
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B. Critical Theory as a Method to Unmask Cyber-Registration Under
Crimmigration-Counterterrorism Policy
Both the Chinese Exclusion Act and Japanese Internment were
dressed in a national security rationale that the Court embraced.298 With
the perspective of history, experts note that racism and xenophobia,
rather than national security, was the driving force.299 We do not have the
benefit of history in the present context, even if there is significant
evidence that current xenophobic trends are seizing upon and gaining
expression through policies attempting to address the real security threat
posed by terrorism.300 Thus, prevention of invidious discrimination
depends heavily on the robustness of any judicial review available in due
process and other challenges to government efforts to ban, restrict, or
target surveillance on various social groups.301
Even biometrics, which in some sense purport to stand outside
history, rooted in the signs of the body, have a history and have been a
means for constructing and enforcing racial and cultural divisions.
Databases and their sorting algorithms, in short, cannot be taken on their
own terms because their effects on society will be real and so there must
be vigilance to ensure they are not also pernicious.
In this context, judicial challenge currently provides an unlikely
avenue to protect rights in large part because there is very little
understanding of how biometric datafication of the body and biometric
surveillance affect rights. This is a topic of interest to surveillance study
scholars and sociologists and should be one of equal interest to legal
scholars who should join in the project of developing what Simone
Browne aptly characterizes as “critical biometric consciousness.”302 By
this, she means a Critical Theory project to educate ourselves and others
on how biometrics work and how they rely upon, and can reinforce,
social racialization and potentially discrimination.
To advance this conversation, legal scholars can engage a wide
range of critical tools303—including Critical Theory, Critical Race
Theory, Surveillance Studies, Critical Terrorism Studies, and other
critical theoretical approaches—to better understand the discriminatory
298. See supra notes 278–284 and accompanying text.
299. See, e.g., Calavita, supra note 26, at 11.
300. See AARTI KOHLI, PETER L. MARKOWITZ & LISA CHAVEZ, CHIEF JUSTICE
EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POLICY, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS:
AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 1, 1–2 (2011),
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf
https://perma.cc/TB4J-UGVP].
301. Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, supra note 2.
302. BROWNE, supra note 7, at 116.
303. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 9.
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aspects of modern vetting and screening systems promulgated by
crimmigration-counterterrorism policies that are heavily cyber- and big
data-reliant. The formulation of an informed and protective social policy
in relation to biometric surveillance and the use of biometric data is a
crucial first step to ensuring individual rights such as due process, equal
protection, and First Amendment rights—among the claims raised in the
Travel Ban litigation—are cognizable in rapidly evolving cyber policy
contexts.
The Travel Ban, while the most prominent part of the Executive
Orders, is not the only part. In the long run, it is likely to be
overshadowed by the long-term consequences of “extreme vetting” and
biometric cybersurveillance of foreigners, and potentially citizens,
deemed to present enough of a risk to warrant surveillance. An outright
legal challenge to these aspects of the Executive Order faces difficulties
in that their impact on individuals will neither be as immediate and
dramatic as banning entrance or return to the country, and indeed with
regard to surveillance, may not be felt at all, at least immediately.
Assessing and even understanding such impacts requires legal scholars to
join the ongoing conversation about biometrics and their use in the
administrative state.304
Scholars like Browne note that biometrics have a veneer of
scientific objectivity and technologic infallibility.305 But in the end they
involve classifying traits of the body such that persons may be identified
as authentically who they say they are. Surveillance technology designed
to identify facial and other features means placing such features within
classificatory frameworks and typologies and that in turn requires
mobilizing racial, ethnic, and gendered categories.306 Indeed Browne
reviewed research on biometrics and finds within that discourse a “racial
nomenclature” that in other contexts would be regarded as “seemingly
archaic” but is alive and well in this cutting edge science.307 In short,
biometrics relies upon, rather than transcends, gendering and racializing
categories.
This in itself, of course, does not make biometrics inherently
discriminatory but a biometric critical consciousness is one that, at a
minimum, seeks to understand how racial and other categories are
mobilized by biometric systems to make the body “readable” and
identifiable. Browne is alert to norms implicit in the very technology.

304. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance
State, 93 MINN. L.R. 1, 25 (2008); Margaret Hu, From the National Surveillance State to
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Certain bodies—elderly and Asian/Pacific Islander, for instance—have
fingerprints that are difficult or impossible to measure, a trait also in
common with laborers in jobs requiring frequent use of caustic
chemicals.308
If biometric researchers are discovering gendered, racial, and even
social class distinctions in the kind of data the body offers up, how much
more so will be the case when such distinctions are actively sought?
Under crimmigration-counterterrorism policies, such amassed data is
being analyzed for purposes of assessing a terror risk. Amassing a
Muslim registry, thus, could create a database and then yield data
patterns that perhaps will be determined to characterize typical “Muslim”
classifications. Other categories could be registered to assist national
security or other policy objectives. Those isolated as fitting those
patterns, but who may not necessarily self-identify with the cyberregistry classification, can be targeted for surveillance, detention, and
other consequences.309
A critical biometric consciousness means we make an effort to
understand how biometrics work and how they employ such categories,
and how, in more subtle ways than imposing outright bans, they create,
or create the potential for, traditional forms of discrimination imposed in
perhaps untraditional ways. And, above all, it means remembering that
humans create the classifications biometrics use; humans create the
algorithms which operate biometric databases, and humans make the
decisions how to act upon the results of biometric matching efforts and
biometric database analyses. As Browne notes, the trigger for acting on
suspicious data may differ depending on race and the type of actions
may, in turn, differ depending on race and other variables.310
Browne calls for approaching data rights through Critical Theory.311
And moreover, a critical biometric consciousness should explore how we
protect due process in the face of decisions to grant or deny rights and
benefits on the basis of purportedly “objective” and “infallible”
biometric matching and analysis.
Scholars in other fields are already turning a critical lens upon this
technology. Browne’s call for a critical biometric consciousness is
invoking the tradition of Critical Theory, a tradition which already holds
a prominent influence in legal scholarship, as seen most prominently in
Critical Race Theory. This kind of scholarship provides a necessary
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309. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Metadeath: How Does Metadata Surveillance
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starting point for an analysis of biometric identification under
crimmigration-counterterrorism policy, especially since, as Browne
points out, racial categories are likely to be prominent in the project of
turning the body into nodes of capturable, classifiable, and then
analyzable data.312
C. Collateral Discrimination Under Crimmigration-Counterterrorism
Policy
In the Fourth Circuit’s en banc decision in International Refugee
Assistant Project, Judge Wynn concluded his concurrence by noting that
President Trump “seemed to suggest during the campaign” that
statistically, Muslims are more likely to engage in terrorism, which
“giv[es] rise to a factual inference” that admission would be harmful to
the United States.313 And yet, regardless of the accuracy of such an
inference, it is “impermissible as a matter of constitutional law” to place
burdens on individuals on the basis of their membership in a protected
class because they lack any moral responsibility for whatever traits one
seeks to attribute to the overall class.314 Doing so cuts against “core
democratic principles” and is “destabilizing to our Republic.”315 As this
administration and future administrations promulgate big data vetting
and cyber-registration, the statistical inference of big data methods of
terroristic screening will likely increase the discrimination that may
attach to correlative threat risk assessments or predictive assessments.316
Judge Wynn’s concurrence, therefore, may prove to be even more
valuable than the Fourth Circuit’s majority opinion in this end. Judge
Wynn broadens an understanding of the crimmigration-counterterrorism
rationales presented by the Administration as a form of national security
pretext for what he views as its underlying invidious discriminatory
impetus. Addressing the national security justifications on their own
terms, he finds them both constitutionally problematic and irrational
312. Id. at 128–29.
313. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 629 (4th Cir.
2017) (Wynn, J., concurring).
314. Id. (Wynn, J., concurring).
315. Id. (Wynn, J., concurring).
In particular, classifying individuals based solely on their race, nationality, or
religion—and then relying on those classifications to discriminate against
certain races, nationalities, or religions—necessarily results in placing special
burdens on individuals who lack any moral responsibility, a result the
Framers deemed antithetical to core democratic principles and destabilizing
to our Republic.
Id. (Wynn, J., concurring).
316. See, e.g., Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, supra note 5, at 1798–99.
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because they do not account for the individual’s intent.317 Instead, they
impute a risk to entire class of individuals who are then targeted by the
Travel Ban. He makes clear that national security risks cannot be
determined by race, religion, or country of national origin.318 Judge
Wynn presses this position to its full extent, urging that it is both illogical
and contrary to core democratic values, and asserting that in stigmatizing
these classes with regard to foreigner status, damage is inevitably done to
U.S. citizens similarly belonging to these classes.319 This last point is
particularly significant, since the stigmatic association with groups and
classes deemed to post terroristic threat risks is not a legal harm that is
easily recognized. Yet, the possibility exists that discrimination against
foreigners on the basis of race, nationality, or religion will redound to
U.S. citizens who belong to those same classes.
When and if the Court will have an opportunity to resolve the
Travel Ban litigation remains unclear at the time of publication.
Regardless of the final disposition of the case, it seems unlikely at this
point that the treatment of the Travel Ban will embrace Judge Wynn’s
recognition of a general stigmatic harm to U.S. citizens who fall within
classes targeted by a ban on foreigners. In part that is because it seems
unlikely, at the merits, that the Court will address the reasoning of a
concurrence.320 Prior to dismissing the case as moot, the Court had
narrowed the lower court’s injunction, finding that a ban on entry of
foreign nationals with insufficient ties to the United States “does not
burden any American party by reason of that party’s relationship with the
foreign national.”321
With a focus back on the issue of biometric cybersurveillance,
Judge Wynn’s concurrence is of keen interest because it is not rooted in
immigration law. Rather, Judge Wynn relies on free-floating statutory
interpretation canons that apply to all statutes, not just the INA
(Immigration and Nationality Act), and require courts to interpret statutes
in ways to avoid constitutional issues. In his reasoning, he acknowledges
the stigmatizing effect of discrimination against protected classes, even
where an individual is not the direct target of such discrimination. It is
likely that cybersurveillance will use such protected classifications in
determining surveillance priorities and in creating algorithms for threat
317. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d at 629 (Wynn, J.,
concurring).
318. Id. (Wynn, J., concurring).
319. Id. (Wynn, J., concurring).
320. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistant Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (narrowing
the injunction in part because the Court concluded that allowing the injunction to prevent
the denial of entry to foreign nationals with no relation to American citizens was not
warranted).
321. Id.
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assessments.322 And in this context, the stigmatizing effects will be real.
Race, nationality, and religion may subject an individual to various forms
of cybersurveillance profiling that one might otherwise escape but for
one’s association with those classes.
This analytical approach to the discriminatory impact of the Travel
Ban, if and when combined with Critical Theory tools, can assist in the
project of unmasking the emerging problem of cyber-registration. Cyberregistration can and should be likened to the paper-based registration
systems structured to track and monitor Chinese immigrants and
Chinese-Americans under the Chinese Exclusion Act323 and the paperbased registration of those of Japanese ancestry and Japanese-Americans
under the Japanese Internment program.324 Without proper legal and
theoretical tools, the risk is a failure to recognize how crimmigrationcounterterrorism cybersurveillance technologies may allow for cyberregistration structures that the government may argue are facially neutral
and justified by compelling national security objectives.
Thus, however unlikely to be embraced by the Court in the future,
Judge Wynn’s concurrence articulates a valuable legal principle that has
the potential of establish limits on cybersurveillance in general, as well
as cyber-registries and digital watchlisting systems, such as terrorist
watchlists and database screening systems that purportedly screen for
terrorism, such as the No Fly List, extreme vetting, and its progeny.
More pragmatically speaking, it may be worth exploring how his judicial
reasoning can be statutorily codified as legal limits on government
action. The lesson to be drawn from this litigation more broadly is that
the INA’s limitations on executive action may be a good model for
legislation seeking to restrain executive authority in the context of
crimmigration-counterrorism cybersurveillance such as extreme vetting
protocols that may eventually extend to screening all citizens and
noncitizens for national security purposes.
CONCLUSION
This Article discussed the manner in which immigration-related
identification and vetting systems can facilitate invidious discrimination.
The types of analyses that can occur with modern biometric
identification systems and algorithmic vetting systems can move beyond
the level of overt and invidious discrimination, the sort that forms the
basis of a legally cognizable claim under the present legal frameworks
that guard against discrimination. Race, national origin, or religion are
322.
323.
324.
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arguably the legally problematic basis for requiring the surrender of
biometric information in the current Proclamation and Executive Order;
but, once that information is in a database, it consists of individualizing
data designed for recognition. Such data is then analyzed to enable risk
determinations, which means risk will have generalizing characteristics.
The question is then two-fold. One question is whether those
generalizing characteristics will act to reinforce prejudicial dispositions
against vulnerable classes of people. The second question is whether they
will serve to obscure any disproportionate impacts of administrative
decisionmaking on such protected classes.
The litigation surrounding the implementation of the Chinese
Exclusion Act and its progeny, and Korematsu and other WWII
Japanese-American Internment cases, teach that in retrospect, national
security justifications can be driven by or give expression to broader
cultural phobias and prejudices that current events help bring to a boiling
point. Interfering with the Executive’s efforts to address national security
is of course a perilous venture. However, history teaches that
discrimination that seems necessary and protective today will often, in
hindsight, seem overbroad, unnecessary, and motivated on some level by
prejudicial social currents. Fully digesting the implications of this
unfolding new immigration policy under crimmigration-counterterrorism
rationales requires placing it in the proper historical context.

